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AND EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE PLANNING:
A CRITIQUE
LUTHER L. McDouGAL III*
During the Middle Ages, many cities in Europe erected walls around
their perimeters for the purpose of protecting themselves from invasion. In
recent years, many local communities in this country have reinstituted a varia-
tion of this ancient practice through extensive use of exclusionary land use
planning ordinances. The perceived enemies of the modern community are
different in the sense that they are prospective residents of the community
rather than hostile military forces. Some of these modern communities erect
exclusionary walls because they fear an invasion by hordes of nonresidents; an
invasion which may change the character of their community or severely
damage its environment. Other communities erect these walls with a view
toward excluding only certain classes of nonresidents, specifically those who
cannot afford to pay for all of the community services that they will require.
It is increasingly recognized that such exclusionary land use planning or-
dinances affect many people—particularly those of limited economic
means—in a variety of ways.' The most obvious of these adverse effects is
the limitation that such ordinances impose on the freedom to choose a com-
munity in which to live. Exclusionary land use planning ordinances typically
increase the cost of housing in affected communities, thereby forcing many
families to overpay for housing, 2 live in overcrowded conditions or in sub-
standard housing, or to look elsewhere for their housing needs. ' Local
exclusionary land use ordinances thus are working against the national policy
of providing a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family.'
Yet, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has prescribed policies that
deter to any significant degree local governments from enacting exclusionary
* Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. B.A. 1959; LL.B.
1962, Mississippi; LL.M. 1966, Yale.
' See, e.g., R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973) [here-
inafter cited as BmacocK & BOSSELMANI; E. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING ( 1974) [hereinafter cited as BERGMANI; Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls; An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusion-
ary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV, 767 (1969).,
It is generally agreed that a family is "overpaying" for its housing when it
expends more than 25 percent of its income for housing.
3
 In 1966 it was estimated that there were 6.7 million occupied substandard
units, 6,1 million families living in overcrowded conditions, and 7.8 million families
who could not afford decent housing. The President's Comm. on Urban Housing, A
Decent Home 44 (1968).
4
 National Housing Act of 1949. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1141-1190 (1970).
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ordinances.' While possessing the power to deal with local exclusionary land
use planning, Congress so far has not adequately addressed the prc.thle ► . The
Supreme Court, acting under its present conception of federalism, generally
has deferred to state and local control in the land use planning area. While
some states have, prescribed policies designed to meet their responsibility
under this concept of federalism to deal with the exclusionary practices of
local governments, other states have been less successful or have not perceived
or addressed the problem at all.
This article first will identify the local rationale and the more significant
modes of local exclusionary land use planning. Next, the effect of local
exclusionary land use planning will be examined, with emphasis placed on the
impacts on low income" nonresidents. The national reaction, both by Con-
gress and the Supreme Court, to the problem of exclusionary land use plan-
ning then will be examined. The Housing and Development Act of 1974, and
the recent line of relevant Supreme Court decisions will be discussed in this
section. Next, state response to local exclusionary land use planning will be
investigated. Four representative states, Connecticut, California, New jersey
and Oregon, will be examined in order to analyze the broad spectrum of state
responses to local exclusionary policies. These examinations will reveal that.
the responses to this problem by Congress, the Supreme Court, and most
states have been insufficient and largely ineffectual. In conclusion, several
recommendations for future action will be offered.
I. THE PROBLEM DELIMITED
A. The Perceived Specter of Growth
In the last two decades, suburban communities have absorbed more than
seventy percent of the nation's residential growth: 7
 indeed, more Americans
today live in suburbs than in central cities. 8
 Many suburban communities,
however, failed to anticipate this trend and neglected to formulate adequate
plans for managing the demand for rapid expansion. As a result, these com-
munities soon found themselves unable to maintain the quality and quantity
of community services and facilities that they desired and needed.
5
 See notes 54-104 infra and accompanying text.
6
 Generally, a low income family is deemed to be a family whose income is
less than 80 percent of the median income for the area in which they reside. This is
the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (hereinafter HUD) definition
for purposes of determining eligibility for a subsidy under the section 8 Housing
Assistance Payments Program. See Low Income Housing—HUD, 24 C.F.R. § 883.202
(1978). The definition of a moderate income family is less clear. Presumably it is a
family whose income is less than the median income for the area. In the Section 235
Housing Program, Congress permits participation by those whose incomes are less
than 95 percent of the median for the area. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715Th(2) (Supp. 1980).
Thus those families who make more than 80 percent but less than 95 percent would
presumably be classified as moderate income families.
See Developments in the Law—Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1625 n.7
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
8 Id.
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Other communities in "sun-belt" states," and in states with attractive
natural environments,'" have experienced rapid population growth through-
out the past two decades. Facing the potential impact of such urbanization
upon local character and ecology, these communities have abandoned their
traditional philosophy that "growth is good" for a "growth is bad" ap-
proach." Even serene, bucolic communities have felt the pressure for ex-
pansion and have attempted to avoid intrusion by "second home" builders. 12
In many of these communities, exclusionary land use planning is seen as an
effective method for combating the perceived problems of growth.
The underlying phenomena of growth produced different rationales for
exclusionary land use policies in different communities. Some communities
were particularly concerned with potential growth of low and moderate in-
come families. First, low and moderate income families would require com-
munity services and facilities far in excess of their tax contribution.'" Sec-
ond, many residents of these communities had moved from the central city
precisely to escape the problems that low income families (at. least in their
view) create." In order to discourage or preclude these people from becom-
ing residents, many suburban communities enacted ordinances which effec-
tively increased the cost of housing in the community, thereby placing it
beyond the economic means of low income families.' 5
Other communities have enacted exclusionary land use ordinances for
more subjective reasons. Some partisans of limited development fear that un-
restricted growth will spawn a wide range of undesirable urban problems such
as crime, noise, and pollution, others merely want their community to retain
its present. character, while others are primarily concerned with the environ-
9
 California's population increased at an annual average rate of 4 percent
from 1950-60. 2.3 percent from 1960-70, and 1.4 percent from 1970-78 (total 74.2
percent .
 since 1950). Florida's population increased at the rate of 5.9 percent from
1950-60, 3.2 percent from 1960- 70, 2.8 percent from 1970-78 (total 113.4 percent
since 1950). U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1979, 14
(100th ed.). National annual growth figures were 1,7 percent from 1950-60, 1.3 per-
cent from 1960-70, and 0.8 percent from 1970-78 (total 36.3 percent), Id.
" Between 1970 and 1978, for example, New Hampshire was growing at a
rate slightly over twice the national annual average rate (2.0 versus .8), as was Oregon
(1.9 versus .8). Id.
" See THE URBAN LAND INsTrrtyrE, I MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH
85-86 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH].
12 These pressures produced the contested large-lot zoning in Steel Hill De-
velopment, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
13 See BERGMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
14
 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1627 n.I5 (race probably equally strong as
class bias in motivating some exclusionary practices).
1$
 The initial attempts were ordinances designed to exclude racial minorities.
Such ordinances were stricken as being unconstitutional before zoning became a popu-
lar method of land use planning. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The
more subtle ordinances which were designed to exclude on the basis of wealth ap-
peared not long after the Great Depression. See, e.g., Baker v..Somerville, 138 Neb.
466, 293 N.W. 326 (1940) (2,000 square feet minimum floor area). See generally Wil-
liams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 335-39,
343-46 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living).
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mental and ecological impact of growth: 6 Groups seeking to preserve areas
of historical or architectural significance also may advocate exclusionary land
use planning. In response to these objective and subjective concerns, local and
suburban community planners designed an impressive variety of exclusionary
land use devices.
B. An Identification of the Various
Types of Exclusionary Practices
The diversity of exclusionary land use practices which may he utilized is
limited only by the imagination of local communities. Asa result, a wide
range of devices to effectuate exclusionary policies currently exists. For con-
venience, the exclusionary practices can be identified in relation to four
categories: 1. quantity limits, 2. quality requirements, 3. community fees and
4. political impediments.
Quantity limits are local practices that directly restrict the number or size
of dwellings. Large lot zoning—requiring unnecessarily large residential
lots—is perhaps the most common form of quantity restriction." The pro-
hibition of certain types of dwellings such as mobile homes I  or multi-family
buildings,'" and the zoning of large areas for industrial or annmercial pur-
poses are other techniques available to limit directly the quantity of dwelling
units in a community. Limits on the number of building permits,'" or the
enactment of moritoria 21 on the issuance of permits also are employed to
reduce the gross number of units available.
Quality requirements are local practices purportedly designed to ensure
quality housing. Minimum floor area provisions are common quality require-
ments. 22 Building codes also are frequently modified to require more expen-
sive building materials or procedures that allegedly will produce better quality
but more expensive dwellings." Building costs also are increased by the im-
position of -community charges such as "front end fees - for building permits,
zoning changes, anticipated school costs appearing as a fee for each bedroom,
water and sewer hook-up charges, and inspections. 24
The fourth type of an exclusionary practice utilizes cumbersome and
contentious political processes to control growth. For example, some com-
munities have established referendum requirements for the approval of public
'" See THE URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, 1I MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF
GROWTH, 299-329 (1975) [hereinafter cited as II MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF'
GROWTH].
' 7 See BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
18 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 57.25 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as WILLIAMS].
1 " Id. at § 66.11.
20
 This was made popular by the City of Petaluma, California. For a descrip-
tion of its limits on building permits, see text accompanying notes 174-79 infra.
21
 This is the tactic made popular by Dade County, Florida. See 11 MANAGE-
MENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 16, at 276-77.
22 For a discussion of this device and the cases involving such practice, see
WILLIAMS, supra note 18 §§ 63.01-63.13.
23 1: BABCOCK	 BOSSEILMAN, supra HOW 1, at 13-14.
24 Id. at 11-13. See also 6 Hous.	 DEV. REP. 398 (BNA 1978).
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housing, 25 or for any change in existing permissible land uses in the com-
munity. 28 A popular alternative to a formal political process is an intention-
ally slow administrative process with respect to zoning changes, issuance of
building permits, and other development procedures. 27
Communities frequently employ several types of exclusionary practices
together. For example, in Petaluma, California the community adopted exces-
sive subdivision restrictions involving the dedication of large tracts of land for
parks and schools or fees in lieu thereof, the installation of unnecessarily large
storm sewers, and a provision for costly site improvements and landscap-
ing. 28 Such policies directly affect the quality of life of moderate and lower
income families. In addition, exclusionary practices also may affect adversely
the quality of life for local residents in less obvious ways.
C. Impacts of Exclusionary Practices
Exclusionary land use practices produce a variety of economic and social
effects on both residents and nonresidents of the community. Such practices
have both regional and national repercussions as well. A clear appreciation of
the wide ranging effects of local exclusionary land use practices is a prerequi-
site to a realistic evaluation of the appropriate degree of deference that na-
tional and state decision makers should accord to local decisions implementing
such practices.
Nonresidents who desire or plan to move from their present community
are directly affected by local exclusionary land use practices. The lack of
available housing at a reasonable cost limits the choice of possible living areas
For many nonresidents. Some of the exclusionary practices employed by
communities, such as the exclusion of mobile homes and multi-family dwell-
ings, obviously are designed to exclude from the community persons lacking
the financial resources necessary to purchase a single family residence. Even
those who have the financial resources to purchase modest single family dwell-
ings are excluded from those communities which employ practices like exor-
bitant "front-end fees," excessive subdivision, large minimum floor areas, and
large lot zoning since these practices increase the cost of housing 2 " in the
community beyond the economic means of persons with modest financial re-
sources. Because housing costs are increasing at almost twice the rate of per-
sonal incomes," such practices are excluding an ever increasing portion Of
the population.
25 See, e.g., CAL. CoNs.r. art. XXXIV.
26 Such a referendum requirement engendered - the controversy in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
27 See BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 14-17.
28 Construction Industry of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
2"
	 generally L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, :ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS:
THE IMPACT OF LAND USE CONTROLS ON HOUSING PRICE (1973).
'1 " Between 1971) and 1976 housing costs were increasing at approximately 15
percent. annually, while family income was increasing at 7.8 percent annually. U.S.
Derr. COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS AND U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DE-
VELOPMENT, CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW HOUSING, 1975 (1977).
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In a less obvious fashion, growth control devices such as limitations on
the annual number of building permits or on•the number of dwelling units in
a particular community, or successive moritoria on the issuance of various
other permits also operate to increase the cost of housing. 3 ' The ultimate
effect, which apparently has been reached in some metropolitan areas already,
is to lock the overwhelming majority of low and moderate income persons
into the dismal inner city housing market. 32
 This effect is particularly, dis-
concerting when viewed in light of the movement of employment oppor-
tunities from central cities to suburbs. Because inexpensive mass transit sys-
tems from central city to suburbia rarely exist," exclusionary practices limit
not only housing opportunities, but also employment opportunities for many
persons. 34
When one or more communities in a regional housing market engage in
exclusionary practices, considerable pressure is placed on other communities
in the region to engage in similar practices, since a reduction in the supply of
housing in one area of the market will shift the demand for housing to other
areas in the market." Those communities not utilizing exclusionary practices
thus may sustain growth beyond their normal rates. As this occurs, economic
and political pressure to adopt exclusionary devices will increase in those
communities.
Although the housing situation in central cities is already dismal, it may
become critical in the not too distant future. As a result of housing costs ac-
celerating at a far higher rate than incomes, a steadily increasing number of
people may find it necessary to obtain housing other than a single family
dwelling in suburbia. 31° Consequently', those who would have in the past
moved to suburbia will be forced to compete for housing in the central cities.
These slightly higher income persons then will be competing with lower in-
come persons for existing housing. If this competition for housing occurs, low
and moderate income families will be forced to overpay for their housing to a
greater extent than at present, live in increasingly overcrowded conditions, or
seek housing that is substantially substandard. One need not be a sociologist
to perceive the adverse social implications of worsened conditions for low and
moderate income persons in central cities."
Moreover, those choosing to live in exclusionary communities may be
forced to pay higher rents or to purchase homes at inflated prices." As a
31
 See generally Ellickson „Suburban Growth Controls; An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.j. 385, 390-403 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eflicksonl.
32
 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1626.
33 Id. at 1627.
34
 Id.
35 ElliCkS011, supra note 31, at 402-03.
36
 In 1970, 46.2 percent of all families were able financially to purchase a
median price new house, and 44.8 percent were able financially to buy a median price
existing home. By 1976, these percentages had dropped. to 27 percent and 36 percent
respectively. See JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STunirs, MIT AND HARVARD UNIVERSITIES,
plc NATION'S FIOUSING 1975-1985, 124, 126 (1977).
37
 For a brief description of some of the social implications of slum housing,
see L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 3-21 (1968).
38
 See Ellickson, supra note 31, at 402,
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result, businesses within such communities may have to pay higher wages in
order to attract employees." These businesses will pass some of this increase
on to the consumers in .the community. 40 Because most inquiries have fo-
cused on those who are locked in the central city rather than on those who
live in a largely homogeneous suburban community,'" the social impact on
those living in homogeneous communities is an unknown quantity. 42
Nevertheless, the direct impact of exclusionary devices on moderate and low
income families, coupled with the serious implications for society which such
an impact portends, should be considered in evaluating exclusionary land use
policies.
II. PREFERRED COMMUNITY POLICIES APPLICABLE TO
EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE PLANNING
An individual's living environment influences his health, behavior, at-
titude, family, and social relationships. For many individuals, the community
in which they live determines the scope of their employment opportunities.
Because the community has such significant impact, and because freedom of
choice is a fundamental tenet of free democratic society, a basic national
community policy should afford each individual the widest possible choice of
communities in which to live. Land use planning practices which unduly limit
the availability of residential areas are incompatible with preferred community
policy.
Since most land use planning devices play a vital role in a community's
attempt to achieve a rational use of land within its boundaries, a healthy and
safe environment for its residents, and an overall pleasant place in which to
live, the rejection of all land use planning devices that increase the cost of
housing is unacceptable. The difficult task is determining which of the various
land use planning practices, from the perspective of the larger community,
unduly limit the choice of individuals. Abstract formulations of policies or
doctrines to simplify this task are not available; each community plan must be
examined in its total context. For example, restrictions on the number of
dwelling units in a particular community may be justifiable if incorporated
within a regional plan for environmental or ecological protection and ample
housing provisions for all economic segments are available in nearby corn-
3" Id. at 402 n.40.
4" d. If they are able to pass these costs on to the consumers in the com-
munities, then renters and new homeowners will suffer even greater economic losses
by living in the community. Resident landlords' and existing homeowners' economic
gains in the price of their housing, assuming they remain in the community for any
length of time, will be offset by the increased cost of living they sustain. Of course, in
many instances, merchants, because of competition in nearby communities, will be un-
able to pass these costs on to the consumers and thus will have to absorb the additional
costs and reduce their profits.
4 ' For an early recognition and discussion of the social problems associated
with exclusionary practices, see Williams, Planning Law and Dernocralk Living, supra note
15.
42 For an analysis of the social consequences of a national zero population
growth, see I MANAGEMENT & Comm. OF GROWTH, supra note 11, at 378-89.
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munities. But the same limits on dwelling units rarely are acceptable when
they are not a part of an integrated regional plan. A subdivision regulation
standing alone which requires the dedication of ten percent of the land in a
subdivision for park purposes may be viewed as unduly increasing the cost of
housing in the community. If it were coupled, however, with other programs
designed to ensure the availability of housing within the community for all
economic groups, such a dedication requirement would be justifiable.
From the perspective of the larger community, whether it be defined as
the state, the region, or the nation, reasons propounded by isolationist com-
munities to support their exclusionary practices are rarely acceptable. Excep-
tional instances exist. when unique environments or significant ecological sys-
tems must be protected. Justifications based upon the preservation of the
community character,. fiscal integrity, or other purely provincial concerns,
however, cannot be given much weight when their effect will be to limit the
potential choice of living conditions for millions of people. While rejection of
these justifications impairs the ability of individual community residents to
direct community development, this infringement is limited. By proper land
use planning, such communities can accommodate additional people of all
economic levels and still retain much of their local flavor and fiscal integ-
rity. 4"
The elimination of exclusionary practices other than those promoting
preferred policies must be viewed as only the initial step in providing indi-
viduals in this country with the widest. possible choice of communities in which
to live. Elimination of the problems created by exclusionary practices does not,
mean that housing affordable to millions of Americans will be built. The ac-
tual provision of affordable, decent housing in communities across the nation
is a major problem unto itself. Widespread availability of such housing, how-
ever, is not posSible until the exclusionary walls constructed by many com-
munities in this country are destroyed.
Because the free movement of people across state lines has long been a
matter within the scope of federal authority," the federal government could
4"
 Conflicting studies exist on the fiscal impact of growth. Sonic indicate that
growth improves the fiscal strength of it community, while others indicate the opposite.
This situation may stein from disagreement over the manner for measuring the fiscal
impacts of growth. For discussions of the methods to be employed in analyzing the
fiscal impacts of growth. see I MANAGEmEsrr & CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 11, at
494-554.
" In 1941, California asserted that a high influx of migrants caused health
and morals problems and threatened the state's fiscal integrity. California, therefore,
claimed to be justified in prohibiting any person from bringing a nonresident indigent
person into the stale. The Supreme Court rejected the justifications and declared the
statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a burden on interstate commerce.
And none [limitations on state legislative authority] is more certain than
the prohibition against attempts on the part of a single State to isolate itself
from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation
of persons and property across its border .... For the social phenomenon
of large-scale interstate migration is as certainly a matter of national con-
cern as the provision of assistance to those who have found a permanent or
temporary abode.
Edwards v. California, 3 t4 U.S. 160, 173, 175 (194 1).
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play a major role in removing exclusionary land use planning practices as a
barrier to such movement. Congress recently promulgated the goals of obtain-
ing lull employment and balanced growth, 45 but because of its present con-
ception of federalism, it has failed to enact meaningful legislation designed to
achieve such goals. Similarly, the approach to federalism espoused by the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger permits local exclusionary
practices to flourish.
III. NATIONAL RESPONSE To LOCAL
EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE PRACTICES
A. Congressional Action
Four decades ago, Congress declared a national goal to be the provision
of a "decent home and a suitable living environment for every American fain-
ily." 4" In pursuit of this goal, Congress through the years has enacted legisla-
tion establishing and Funding a variety of programs designed to provide low
and moderate income housing, to clear or rehabilitate slums and blighted
areas, and to supply needed community services and facilities." None of this
legislation, however, provides for federal implementation of the programs,
nor does it require specific action by local governments. Instead, the legisla-
tion merely attempts to induce local communities to undertake necessary
projects by offering substantial federal financial assistance." Its failure to
address the problem of exclusionary zoning through preventive legislation
suggests a high degree of federal respect for local self-determination.
Traditionally, however, Congress has been willing to infringe upon local
autonomy whenever local governments applied for and received federal fi-
nancial assistance. Believing that local governments should use federal funds
to promote declared national objectives, Congress itself imposed, and fre-
quently authorized appropriate federal agencies to impose stringent condi-
tions on the use of federal wealth.' This infringement upon the autonomy
of local governments, however, drew criticism," As experience with the var-
44 See Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. 1– No. 95-
" National Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441-1490 (197W.
47 For a discussion of various programs that have been terminated, see R•-
PORT or THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON' URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY (1968): L. FRIEDMAN, GoVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING (I 968) [hereinafter cited
as FRIF.DmAtq].
" See FRIEDMAN, SlIpra note 47. at I 9 0 - 9 1
4 " See Fish man, Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974:
New Federal and Local Dynamics In CoMMUnity Development, 7 URB. LAW. 189, I 95-97
(1975).
'" President Ford, on signing the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, summarized the position of these critics: "In a very real sense, this bill will
help return power from the banks of the Potomac to people in their own communities.
Decisions will be made at the local level. And responsibility will be placed squarely
where it belongs—at the local level." Gerald R. Ford, Statement on the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, August 22, 1974, Public Papers of the Presidents
43. See also Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Special Revenue
Sharing for Urban Community Development., March 5, 1971, Public Papers of the Presi-
dents 3415.
523.
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ions programs grew, these critics claimed that the federal strings attached to
various programs made them unnecessarily lengthy, unduly complex, and ex-
cessively expensive. The philosophical premise underlying much of this criti-
cism was the belief that state and local governments, rather than federal
bureaucrats, were best able to solve local problems. With the election of
Richard M. Nixon as President, these critics gained a powerful advocate. The
Nixon Administration introduced several bills in Congress which sought to
achieve a new. federalism in the area of federal financial assistance to local
governments. 5 ' Congress, partially in response to the prodding of the Nixon
Administration, enacted the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974. 52
 A close examination of Title 1—Community Development (CD)—
and Title II—Assisted Housing (AH)—of this Act reveals the extent to which
Congress has adopted the no strings" or "minimal strings" approach to fed-
eral financial assistance.
I. Title 1, Housing and Community Development Act of 1979
—Community Development
Congress stated its primary purpose in enacting the CD program to be
"the development of viable urban communities, by providing decent housing
and a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities,
principally for person of low and moderate income."" In part, the program
aims to reduce the isolation of income groups within communities and geo-
graphical areas, to promote an increase in the diversity and vitality of
neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities
for persons of lower income, and to revitalize deteriorating or deteriorated
neighborhoods to attract persons of higher income." The Act also seeks to
encourage "areawide development planning," 55 and, thus, may he viewed as a
federal attempt to discourage local exclusionary land use practices.
This interpretation is strengthened by a requirement that each CD appli-
cation contain a Housing Assistance Plan (HAP). 5 " Such plans must include
51 See, e.g., Urban Community Development Revenue Sharing Act of 1971,
H.R. 8853, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1618, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Better
Communities Act, H.R. 7277. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973): S. 1743, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
" Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.).
53 See 42	 § 5301(c) (Supp. V 1975).
54 Id. at § 5301(c)(6).
55 Id. at § 5301(d)(2).
The legislation does not reflect a firm commitment to areawide planning. The
House Report on the bill states:
It should be noted that, with respect to comprehensive areawide planning,
the bill contemplates only that areawide planning he Fully recognized by
each applicant as a guide to governmental action .... Applicants would
not be rigidly bound by comprehensive plans, nor would areawide agencies
be given any power they do not now possess under State law to disapprove
proposals that are inconsistent with comprehensive plans.
H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 - 7 (1974).
56 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
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an accurate assessment of the housing needs of lower income persons "resid-
ing in or expected to reside in the community," plus both an annual and a
three year goal relative to the provision of needed housing. 57 This provision,
when coupled with the areawide planning objective, appears to promote con-
sideration of inter-community housing needs by applicant communities.
Nevertheless, closer examination of the CD program, particularly as it
exists after several recent amendments, reveals that the commitment of Con-
gress to the elimination of exclusionary land use practices is extremely weak.
The entire CD program is optional; communities desiring to engage in
exclusionary practices may refuse to participate" or even continue their
exclusionary practices while participating in the CD program." This may
occur primarily because of three provisions of the Act.
The CD provisions presume that each application is entitled to approval
by the Secretary of HUD. The Secretary can disapprove an application only a)
when on the basis of generally available significant facts and data the appli-
cant's assessment of its housing needs is "plainly inconsistent" with such facts
or data; b) when the proposed projects are "plainly inappropriate" to congres-
sional objectives; or c) when the application does not comply with the re-
quirements of the title or other applicable law."" No authorization is pro-
vided for the Secretary to make an in-depth independent investigation into
the applicant's own assessment of its housing needs before final approval is
given. In addition, the Secretary of HUD clearly bears the burden of dem-
onstrating that an applicant's proposal will not further congressional objec-
tives.
The possibility of disapproval on grounds that the applicant would not
further congressional objectives became even more remote following a 1978
amendment to the CD legislation. This amendment clearly prohibits disap-
proval of any application unless "the Secretary determines that the extent to
which a primary purpose is addressed is plainly inappropriate to meeting the
community's efforts to achieve the primary objective of this title."" Prior to
this amendment, the Secretary apparently could disapprove an application on
the grounds that the proposed projects furthered only some of the specific
objectives of Congress while slighting or ignoring others." 2 In a second
" Id.
" See Comment, Symbolic Gestures and False Hopes: Low Income Housing Dispersal
After Gautreaux and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 21 Si. Louis
U.L.J. 759, 773-74 (1978); Comment, National Problems and Local Control: Tension in
Title 1 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 409, 443-44 (1977).
" A report prepared by Community Legal Services, Inc. of Philadelphia,
which is based on surveys of 46 communities, found that housing assistance perform-
ance rates were very low in almost every city surveyed. In some, the rate was zero. See
7 Hous. & DEV. REP. 1008-09 (BNA 1980)
"" 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. V 1975).
'' Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-557 § 103(d), 92 Stat. 2080 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 5304).
n H. CONF. REP. No. 95-1792, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1978), reprinted in
119781 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. News 4872, 4881. For example, the proposal might
further the congressional objective of restoring and preserving property of historic or
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amendment," Congress dispelled any notion that a community's Housing As-
sistance Plan required an assessment of low income housing needs created by
other factors than increased employment opportunities within the commu-
n i ty. 64 As a result, a bedroom suburban community's assessment of its low
income housing needs can approach, if not reach, zero.
While these recent amendments have not removed all "federal strings,"
those that exist are extremely thin and can be rarely pulled by the Secretary
of HUD. The Assisted Housing provisions contained in Title VI do not sub-
stantially alter this approach.
2. Title II, Assisted Housing
The first sessions of the AH legislation are concerned with public hous-
ing much as it was envisioned in the original Housing Act of 1937. 45 These
housing projects are built only when a local community opts to participate. It
is unlikely that any community engaging in exclusionary practices will opt to
participate in any meaningful degree. This program has been in existence for
more than half a century and has clone little to disperse spatially low and
moderate income persons. In fact, it can be viewed as having had the opposite
effect. 66
Section 8 of the AH legislation, however, appears to offer some hope for
the spatial deconcentration of low and moderate income persons. It au-
thorized the Secretary of HUD to assist. from annual contribution contracts
eligible persons in rental payments."' Because it contains expanded income
limits," the rental assistance is available to the whole range of low income
families. The contracting authority of the Secretary under section 8 embraces
not only local housing agencies, but also private owners." These latter con-
architectural value, but not further its objective of spatial deconcentration. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5301(c)(7) (Stipp. V 1975).
6" Id. at § 5301(c)(6).
''° The amendment inserted after the phrase "expected to reside in the com-
munity" the following: "as a result of existing or projected employment. opportunities
lit the community." Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-557 § I03(c), 92 Stat. 2080 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 5304).
A draft HUD handbook indicates that HUD will begin monitoring communities
more closely with regard to their implementation of their HAP. See 6 Hoes. L DEv.
REP, 719-20 (BNA 1978). If this drab is approved by the Secretary, it is difficult to
envision how HUD's strict scrutiny in light of this amendment. to the HAP require-
ment will be successful in achieving spatial deconcentration.
"5
 Act of Sept. 1, 1937, Ch. 896, § I, 150 Stat. 888, as amended 42 U.S.C.
1401 et seq. (1978).
For a discussion of the evolution and modification of the public housing program,
see Catz, Historical amt Political Background If Federal Public Housing Programs, 50 N.
DAKom I.,. REV. 25 (1973).
66 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 122-23.
67
 42 U.S.C. § 14371(b) (Stipp. V 1975).
" 8 Compare 24 C.F.R. § 860.3 (1979), which sets forth HUD guidelines for
public housing income limits, with 24 C.F.R. 880.102 (1979), which defines a low
income faintly for section 8 housing- .
42 U.S.C. § 14371(h) (Stipp. V 1975).
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tracts are permissible only in the absence of a local housing agency or when
the Secretary determines that the local agency is unable to implement the
provisions of section 8. 7 ° Under these contracts, private owners lease rental
units to eligible low and moderate income persons. 7 '
Local governmental agencies must be notified of such proposed action by
the Secretary and afforded an opportunity to comment." If the local gov-
ernment objects by claiming that a proposal is inconsistent with its Housing
Assistance Plan, the Secretary must first determine if such a conflict exists
before the proposal can be approved." If there is no HAP for the commu-
nity, the Secretary must establish a need for the assisted housing and the
existence of adequate public services and facilities for the proposed housing.
Thus, Congress has conferred on the Secretary of HUD authority to override
the desires of local governments in limited instances. The number of instances
in which this actually will occur, however, is limited not only by the Secretary's
willingness to approve a proposal in the face of local opposition, but also by
the scarcity of private owners willing to undertake such projects," and on the
availability of land within a community subject to land use controls that make
such a project possible and economically feasible. Although the section 8 legis-
lation does reflect, some federal overriding of local autonomy, the various
barriers• to the location of low and moderate income housing in unwilling
communities preclude the conclusion that this legislation represents a major
contradiction to the concept of federalism reflected in the CD provisions. It
does permit, however, a conclusion that Congress's commitment to local au-
tonomy is less firm than that of the Supreme Court.
B. The Action of the Burger Court 
-
The willingness, in principle, of Congress to override local land use pol-
icy to accomplish national housing policy has not been matched by the Su-
preme Court. The Burger Court accords great deference to local com-
munities; the Court has been very hesitant to apply constitutional guarantees
to strike local exclusionary practices. The Court's deference to local decisions
is grounded in a strong belief in local autonomy. This conception of
federalism has slowly emerged in a series of recent cases involving either
equal protection or due process challenges to local exclusionary land use
policies.'' The Court has uniformly upheld local action against a claimed
70 Id.
7 ' Id. at § 1437f(c).
72 Id. at § 1439(a).
73 Id.
7 " HUD set a goal of obtaining reservations for 288,500 section 8 rental units.
With slightly Inure than a month left in the fiscal year, it was falling short by 175,000
units. See 6 Hous. & Dcv. REP. 388 (BNA 1978).
75
 See, e.g., Little, The United States Supreme Court and Land Use Regulation: The
Latest Round, 52 Tut.. I.. Rev. 476 (1978): Mandelker, Racial Discriminatory and
Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. Rev. 1 217  (1977):
Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Worth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978); Wright. Constitutional Rights and Land Use
Planning: The New and the Old Reality, 1977 Duna: I,. J. 841.
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violation of the equal protection clause; due process challenges have been only
slightly more successful. This section of the article will briefly discuss the
major cases attempting to identify the impact of the Court's conception of
federalism on local land use policy.
I. Equal Protection Challenges
In the 1971 case of James v. Valtierra:" the Burger Court first consid-
ered the constitutional ramifications of local exclusionary zoning, An article of
the California Constitution requires local governments to obtain authorization
from their electors before undertaking the development, construction, or ac-
quisition of a low rent housing project. Pursuant to this Article, the City of
San Jose and San Mateo County submitted proposals for low rent housing
projects to their respective electors. After both electorates had rejected these
proposed projects, local citizens instituted suits, alleging eligibility for the low
rent housing projects and claiming that the referendum requirement denied
them equal protection of the laws. A majority of the Supreme Court" first
determined that the referendum provision was not aimed at a racial minority
and then found no violation of the equal protection clause because "provisions
for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimina-
tion, or prejudice." 78 In this decision a majority of the Court refused to
override local zoning provisions on equal protection grounds absent evidence
of racially discriminatory intent." The Court thereby revealed a strong
commitment to the principles of local self-determination.
This commitment was reinforced by the 1973 case of Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas. 8° There the village had adopted an ordinance prohibiting more
than two unrelated persons from living in a house located within a single
family residential zone. Six unrelated college students were living in such a
house when the village served an Order to Remedy Violations on the owner.
The owner, with three of the students, filed suit contending that the ordi-
nance violated the equal protection clause and the rights of travel, privacy,
and association. The Court rejected the various constitutional challenges
summarily," and stated that a community could "Jay out zones where family
76 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
77 Justice Douglas took no part in the case. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun dissented. The dissenters believed that the referendum provision, which was
applicable only to low income housing and not to other types of public housing, such
as housing for veterans or public employees, was a classification based on poverty and,
therefore, a suspect classification. Applying strict judicial scrutiny, the dissenters con-
cluded that the referendum provision "tramples the values that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect." Id. at 145.
78 Id. at 141.
76 Id. at 143.
" 416 U.S. 1 (1973).
$I Mr. Justice Brennan dissented on the grounds that the case presented by
the students had become moot because they had vacated the premises and the owner
lacked standing to present the case because there was no claim that the owner faced
economic loss and the owner could not assert the constitutional rights of prospective
unrelated tenants. He believed the Court should not have addressed the merits of the
case, but should have remanded the case to determine if it presented a "case or con-
troversy." 416 U.S. at 10.
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values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people." 82
Two years later, in Warth v. Seldin, 83
 the Court confronted a more
broadly based exclusionary policy. Penfield, a suburb of Rochester, New York,
had zoned 98% of its vacant land for single family residences. It was alleged
that the town also had imposed unreasonable lot size, floor area, setback and
habitable space requirements. Only 0.3% of available land was zoned for
multi-family dwellings. Even in this limited area, low and moderate income
housing was effectively precluded by low density requirements. Nevertheless,
the Court refused to address the merits of the case. Instead, the Court deter-
mined that none of the various classes of plaintiffs had standing to contest the
constitutionality of the Penfield practices. One effect of this decision is to
make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a wide range of individuals
or concerned non-profit organizations to pierce the threshold' barrier of
standing in order to test. the exclusionary practices of local governments. The
major significance of this case, however, is that the Court set forth, albeit in
summary form, its conception of federalism in the land-use planning area:
We also note that zoning laws and their provisions, long consid-
ered essential to effective urban planning, are peculiarly within the
province of stale and local legislative authorities. They are, of course, sub-
ject to judicial review in a proper case. But citizens dissatisfied with
provisions of such laws need not overlook the availability of' the
normal democratic process."
This statement effectively summarizes the approach espoused earlier by the
Court in Valtierra and Belle Terre.
The Court again considered an equal protection challenge to allegedly
racially discriminatory exclusionary land use practices in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp. 8'' In Arlington Heights, the Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation (MHDC), a non-profit corporation created to de-
velop low and moderate housing, sought rezoning of a fifteen acre tract of
land, which it had leased and would purchase pursuant to a contract of sale if
the rezoning was obtained, from single family to multi-family residential. It
sought the rezoning in order to build a federally financed cluster of town-
houses for low and moderate income persons. The Village of Arlington
Heights, a suburb of Chicago with a 1970 population of 64,000 of which only
27 were black, denied MHDC's request for a rezoning. MHDC filed suit con-
tending that the denial of the rezoning was racially discriminatory and there-
fore violated the equal protection clause and the Fair Housing Act. Several
other parties joined MHDC as plaintiffs including Ransom, a Negro who as-
serted that he worked in Arlington Heights but lived twenty miles away. Ran-
Mr. Justice Marshall dissented on the basis that the ordinance violated the stu-
dents' fundamental rights of association and privacy which means that the ordinance
had to protect a substantial and compelling state interest. He found no such interest
and thus found the ordinance unconstitutional. 416 U.S. at 12, 19-20.
82 Id. at 9.
53 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
84
 Id. at 508 n.18.
55 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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som also alleged that he would qualify for MHDC's proposed project and
would move into it if given the opportunity.
The initial portion of the decision was concerned with the standing of
the parties attempting to present the equal protection claim. There the Court
determined that Ransom had standing. With respect to the merits of the case,
however, the Court found that discriminatory effect alone was insufficient to
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. It required proof of ra-
cially discriminatory intent or purpose before the equal protection clause
would become efficacious."'' The Court determined that. the plaintiffs had
not proven that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the denial
of MHDC's rezoning request, and thus there was no violation of the equal
protection clause." Because it will be extremely difficult in most instances to
prove that a local government engaged in land use practices for racially dis-
criminatory purposes, the effect of this decision is to give deference to local
self-determination even when the determinations have severe racially dis-
criminatory impacts. Thus, even the equal protection clause, as interpreted by
the Burger Court, imposes limited restraints upon local autonomy."
"" Id. at 264-65. Mr. justice Stevens took no part in the case. Mr. justice Mar-
shall and Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in most of the decision, but believed the
merits of the case should have been remanded to the court of appeals for review in
light of the decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Id. at 271-72. The
Washington decision was rendered after the court of appeal's decision in Arlington
Heights.
Mr. Justice White dissented. He agreed with the other dissenters that the case
should have been remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of
Davis, but also believed that the court of appeals should consider the Fair Housing Act
before reaching the constitutional issue. Id. at 272-73.
N4
 The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of
alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 271.
8 8
 Two recent circuit court decisions indicate that the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 Sc Stipp. II 1980) imposes restraints upon local
autonomy. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, upon remand of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283 (1977), determined that in certain instances the Fair Housing Act of
1968 would preclude land-use planning activities that have racially discriminatory ef-
fects. It began its analysis with a determination that the Act should be interpreted
broadly to ensure integrated housing patterns in the country. The Court then recog-
nized that in many instances it will be impossible to prove overt bigotry because bigots
have become more discreet in recent years. It decided that Congress in enacting the
Act had no intention to permit municipalities to systematically deprive minorities of
housing opportunities simply because those municipalities act discreetly. Id. at 1290.
Yet, the court decided that a showing of racially discriminatory effect alone was not
sufficient to establish a violation of the Act. It identified four factors that should be
examined in determining whether the Act was violated:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect: (2) is
there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy
the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; (3) What is the defend-
ant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does the plaintiff
seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for mem-
bers of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfer-
ing with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.
Id. These factors, in the court's opinion, should not be viewed as essential elements of
a claim based on the Act, because a violation may have occurred even though one or
more of the factors is missing. If an examination of these factors reveals a close case, it
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2. Due Process Challenges
In another local referendum case, city
 of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 8 " a real estate development firm sought to have an eight acre tract of
land rezoned from light industrial to a .zone which would permit. it to con-
struct a multi-family, high rise apartment building. While the firm's applica-
tion was being processed, the voters of Eastlake adopted a charter amendment
requiring all changes in permissible land uses within the city approved by the
city council to be submitted to the electors of the city. The rezoning sought by
the firm subsequently was approved by the city council, but was rejected by
the electorate when submitted to them pursuant. to the charter amendment.
The firm tiled suit in state court contending that the referendum requirement
constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people.
Relying to a large extent on their decision in Valtierra, a majority of the Court
determined that a referendum on a legislative matter could not possibly be
characterized as an unconstitutional delegation of power."' It also rejected a
contention that the referendum requirement was a standardless delegation of
power and thus violated the clue process clause because it might produce ar-
bitrary and capricious decisions based on the whims of the electors."' In
rejecting this contention, the Court noted the absence of any assertion that
the particular decision in the case was arbitrary and capricious, and observed
that if such were the case, a particular decision could he attacked on such
grounds. " 2
 The Court thus rejected yet another constitutional challenge to
an exclusionary land use practice.
Although the Court in Warth indicated that local autonomy was subject to
judicial review in a proper case, to date the Court has rejected almost every
conceivable constitutional challenge to a wide variety of exclusionary
techniques. It appears questionable whether any constitutional limitations on
local exclusionary practices exist other than, perhaps, a demonstration of ra-
cial discrimination. This, of course, does not mean that the Court perceives no
should be resolved by finding a violation of the Act because such a resolution will
promote the congressional policy of providing integrated housing.
In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (1977), the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Act. In
further support of such an interpretation, the court noted that Senator Baker had
introduced an amendment to the Act that required proof of discriminatory intent be-
fore violation would exist. This amendment was defeated, 114 CONG. REC. 5221-22
(1968). The defeat indicates that the Senate believed proof of discriminatory intent
was not a prerequisite to a violation of the Act.
These two cases offer some hope of future federal control of local exclusionary
practices. But they cannot be viewed as being expansive enough to control more than a
limited number of exclusionary plans.
89
 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
9° Mr. Justice Powell dissented because he believed that singling out an indi-
vidual parcel and subjecting it to a vote of the electorate was a fundamentally unfair
procedure. Id. at 680.
Mr. justice Stevens and Mr. Justice Brennan dissented on the grounds that the
popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of individual liti-
gants."•/d. at 693.
"' Id. at 672-73.
12 Id. at 676-77.
318	 BOSTON COI I EGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 21:301
constitutional restraints on local autonomy. There will be certain instances
when a local government's actions are so incredible that a majority of the
Court will intervene and strike them as unconstitutional. One such instance is
found in the Court's recent decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 93 a sequel to
the Belle Terre decision.
East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling to
members of a family. Moreover, the ordinance defined "family" as encompass-
ing a few categories of related persons. Mrs. Moore had a son, his son, and
another grandson living with her. This latter grandson, age ten, had been
living with Mrs. Moore since his mother died when he was one year old. He,
however, did not fall within the definition of family in the ordinance, and the
city notified Mrs. Moore that he was an "illegal occupant" who had to be
expelled from her home. She refused and criminal charges were filed against
her. In the criminal proceeding, she contended that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, but her contentions were rejected. She was found guilty, sentenced
to five days in jail, and fined twenty-five dollars.
A majority of the Supreme Court." was willing to strike the ordinance
on the basis that it deprived Mrs. Moore of her liberty and thus violated the
due process clause. A plurality believed the extended family to be an institu-
tion so deeply rooted in this country's history and tradition that any legislative
interference with the living arrangements of such a family requires the Court
to examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
by any legislative interference. East Cleveland justified the ordinance on the
grounds that it prevented overcrowding, minimized traffic, and avoided plac-
ing an undue financial burden on the city's school system. The plurality
found that the ordinance attained those interests only tenuously, and thus
could not withstand the due process attack. 95 In a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. justice Marshall, agreed with the plurality
opinion but felt constrained to emphasize the impact which such an ordinance
would have on racial and ethnic minorities, many of whom live in extended
families.`"' Although the Moore decision could signal the beginning of a trend
away from a strong belief in local autonomy, such a possibility in light of its
prior decisions appears unlikely. The intervention of the Court in Moore most
probably is attributable to an outrageous criminal ordinance which interfered
"3 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
"4 Mr. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, but believed the ordinance
should have been stricken because it did not bear any "substantial relation to the pub-
lic health, safety, murals, or general welfare." Id. at 520.
Mr. Chief justice Burger dissented on the basis that the plainiff had not
exhausted her state administrative remedies.
Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, dissented on the
merits. He concluded: "The city has undisputed power to ordain single-family residen-
tial occupancy .... And that power plainly carries with it the power to say what a
'family' is." Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
"5 Id. at 500.
"" Mr. Justice Brennan noted that the extended family is a product of 'brutal
economic necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large
numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society. For them compelled pool-
ing of scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household." Id. at 508.
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with a basic American institution, the family. Consequently, the .decision re-
flects no more than the Court's reaction to such a factual pattern.
Standing restrictions, an unwillingness to expand equal protection
guarantees, and a difficult' standard of proof for due process challenges are
all products of the Burger Court's conception of federalism—almost unfet-
tered local government self-determination. This concept of federalism is sup-
portable in this area of federal concern, however, only if the states and local
governments are shouldering their responsibility by eliminating exclusionary
land use practices. This article now will turn to an examination of state and
local government actions, or inactions, with respect to exclusionary land-use
practices.
IV. STATE ACTION
Traditionally, state officials, like the Burger Court and Congress, have
firmly believed in the concept of local autonomy in the land use planning
area. Until relatively recently,"' all of the states have followed the path en-
visioned by the early advocates of zoning and have enacted enabling legisla-
tion authorizing local governments to undertake and implement individual
plans." 8 Consequently, local governments have had complete control over
their land use planning process which traditionally included the option of hav-
ing no process at all."
State response to the current problems of local exclusionary land use
practices varies widely. Many states, Connecticut for example, have not re-
sponded in any meaningful manner. Other states, such as California, have
responded in a limited manner. Two states, however, New Jersey and Ore-
gon, have prescribed policies designed to meet the challenge of exclusionary
local land use practices. The Supreme Court of New jersey has been the
cathartic force in that state, while the Oregon legislature has served that role
in Oregon. This section will examine the experience of these four states in an
attempt to identify the variety of state responses and determine whether Con-
gress and the Supreme Court are justified in according so much deference to
state and local authorities.
A. Connecticut
A 1974 survey of housing needs in Connecticut indicated that between
1974 and 1980 there would be a need for 164,000 units." 10 Of these units,
97 Until 1965, only one state, Hawaii, strayed from the traditional approach.
Hawaii adopted a combined state and local approach to land use planning in 1961.
Since 1965, several states have enacted legislation conferring some authority on state
agencies. See T. PELHAM, STATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND REGULATION (1979); Com-
ment, State Land Use Structures: A Comparative Analysis, 45 FORDHAM L. Rev. 1154
(1977).
"8 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, Department of Commerce 1926
has been adopted, at least in a modified form, at some time in all fifty states and
continues in effect in the vast majority of states. See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at
18.01.
"" Id. at § 18.02.
Do COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING DIVISION, CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT, CONNECTICUT PROPOSED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
PLAN — REVISION OF 1979, 42 (1979).
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approximately eighty-six percent would be needed by households with in-
comes less than $10.000."' Approximately half of the total number of units
would be needed by the elderly and minorities."' Rather than increased
construction and rehabilitation to meet these needs, Connecticut witnessed a
dramatically slowed pace of construction. 10 ' Connecticut's Office of Policy
and Management attributes this to several factors including "zoning practices
of some towns [which] have the effect of limiting the availability of land suit-
able for housing for families having limited incomes."'"
This conclusion by the Office of Policy and Management is not mere
speculation. A comprehensive survey of local government zoning undertaken
in 1970 1 " supports the conclusion. A compilation of the data revealed that
the largest amount of land in the state was zoned single family residential and
required a minimum lot size of between one-half to two acres.'li' Another
substantial portion was zoned the same and required a lot of more than two
acres.'" An examination of the composite map prepared in connection with
the survey" reveals that every major city in the state is surrounded by such
zoning. In addition, out of the approximately 150 municipalities which had
zoning, one-third did not permit any multiple family dwellings, and many of
those that did, permitted only low density multi-family units.'"
Although the state legislature ilas recognized the existence of exclusion-
ary practices and the need for state planning,'" it has decided that there
should be no direct state intervention in local land use planning processes.'"
A state conservation and development policies plan, which will include goals
and policies relevant to housing, is to be adopted by the legislature."' The
101 hi .
102 Id. at 42-43.
103 Id. at 41.
"4 Id. at 42.
"s See Office of State Planning, Connecticut Dep't of Finance & Control, Pro-
posed a Plan of Conservation & Development for Connecticut, 33-40 (1973).
" 6 Id. at 37.
107 Id .
'°" Id. at 38-39, entitled State of Connecticut Zoning 1970 Composite of Local
Regulations.
1110 Id. at 38.
The existence of exclusionary practices in Connecticut is also suggested in City of
Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976). The City of Hartford
and two of its low income residents filed suit seeking an injunction prohibiting seven
of its suburban communities from receiving or expending grants from HUD because
their grant applications contained no estimate or an inaccurate estimate of persons
"expected to reside" in their community. The court determined that the plaintiff's
lacked standing to object to HUD's waiver of the HAP requirements. This failure to
file an accurate HAP indicates these communities had no interest in providing low and
moderate income housing.
110 After the Conservation and Development Plan for Connecticut was pre-
pared in 1973, see note 105 supra, the Connecticut legislature decided that the plan
should be updated and revised and then adopted by the legislature. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16a-24 et seq. (West Supp. 1978).
The plan is to be an advisory document, id. at § 16a - 31. Thus, it will have
no direct effect on local land use planning processes.
12 Id. at § 16a-30.
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goals and policies set forth in the plan should guide future state administra-
tive action in program planning, priorities evaluation, and expenditure of
state funds. ' Although the adoption of such a plan must be viewed as an
appropriate step, its advisory nature reduces its effectiveness as a method for
implementing the stated goals and policies. It is highly unlikely that such a
plan will deter in any meaningful degree local governments from engaging in
exclusionary practices.
The reluctance of Connecticut's legislature to interefere with the au-
tonomy of their local governments is particularly disappointing because the
state has entered into two interstate compacts with expectations of addressing
regional problems. In 1971, Connecticut joined New jersey and New York in
converting the existing Tri-State Transportation Committee and Commission
into the more comprehensive Tri-State Regional Planning Commission. 114
The region encompassed by this compact includes counties in all three states
that can be viewed as comprising the New York City metropolitan area. " 5
Recently the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission has published the hous-
ing element of its comprehensive plan for the region."' If all three states
undertook coordinated actions in accordance with the plan, major strides
toward alleviating the severe housing shortage in this area would be made."'
It is difficult to perceive how Connecticut can coordinate effectively its hous-
ing production with New York and New Jersey when it has delegated its land
use planning authority to its local governments thereby foreclosing any means
of assuring the availability of land zoned for the needed housing units. The
same is true with respect to its participation in the New England Interstate
Planning Compact wherein it joined with Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island to undertake coordinated planning of the region. "8
The widespread existence of large lot zoning in Connecticut is attributa-
ble in part to the view of its Supreme Court of Errors that almost any reason
given by a local government will justify such zoning. This judicial deference to
local self-determination is reflected in the 1959 case of Senior v. Zoning Com-
mission of New Canaan.'" New Canaan, which allegedly had the highest per
capita income of any city in the country in 1950, upzoned over 4,000 acres
from minimum lot sizes of two acres to minimum lot sizes of four acres. A
landowner who claimed to have plans for a development of two-acre lots at-
tacked the rezoning on the grounds that it was unreasonable, arbitrary, and
illegal. In rejecting this contention, the court began with the presumption that
large lot zones in semi-rural areas are valid. Then it noted that the per capita
wealth of the community was a proper fact for the commission "to consider in
" 3 Id. at	 16a-31.
1" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-339 (West. Supp. 1978).
15 The specific counties within the compact region are set forth in id. at Art.
VI (d).
"9 See TRI-STATE REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, PEOPLE DWELLINGS &
NEIGHBORHOODS (1978).
"7 The estimated need for the region between the present and the year 2000
is 1.5 million units. Id. at 6. The Connecticut portion of the total units is 150,000. Id.
at 7.
"9 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-37c (West 1971).
"9 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959).
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deciding whether the establishment of a superior residential district would be
the most appropriate use of this unspoiled area. " 120
 It noted that New
Canaan's zoning ordinance did not limit new residential development to
homes for the wealthy because in addition to the 625 four-acre sites, there
were 1,879 two-acre sites, 753 one-acre sites, 87 half-acre sites, and about
1,100 sites requiring less than a half-acre. Without any further analysis of the
commission's reasons, the court upheld the rezoning.
Since the New Canaan decision, the Connecticut court has consistently
employed the same uncritical and nonpenetrating analysis that it used in the
New Canaan case."' When this judicial deference to local autonomy is
coupled with the legislature's unwillingness to interfere with local land use
planning processes, it becomes obvious that exclusionary zoning is alive and
well in Connecticut. 122
 A similar state of affairs exists in a number of other
states including Georgia 123
 and Illinois. 124
 A few states, however, have
1 " Id. at 535, 153 A.2d at 418.
"' See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at § 39.03.
122 Although some may exist, research and inquiry have revealed no innovative
program by a local government in Connecticut.
' 23
 A recently prepared Georgia housing survey reveals that many communities
in Georgia engage in exclusionary practices, see Georgia State Office of Housing,
Georgia Department of Community Affairs, State of Georgia Housing Element, Part 1,
131 (1977). The practices employed by these communities include large lot zoning,
large minimum floor areas, substantial set-back anti open space requirements, exces-
sive subdivision standards and design criteria such as expensive storm drainage
facilities and large block lengths and widths, and a failure to provide a sufficient
number of sites for multi-family dwellings, see id. at Part V, 131-32. These practices
present a major hurdle to the provision of an additional 695,000 residential units that
are projected as the number of units and units needed to replace lost substandard
units and units needed for projected growth by the end of this year. Id, at Part II, 104.
A combination of an almost unbelievable "home rule" provision in the Georgia
Constitution and an equally unbelievable judicial attitude suggest. that neither the
Georgia legislature nor judiciary will do much of anything to eliminate exclusionary
practices. The Georgia legislature, even if it decided to undertake actions, is
hamstrung by a constitutional provision that states: "The General Assembly shall not,
in any manner, regulate, restrict or limit the power and the authority of any county,
municipality, or any combination thereof', to plan and one as herein defined." GA.
CoNsT, art. IX, § 1V, pant. 11 (11176) (GA. Coot: ANN. § 2-6102 (1977)). In Vulcan
Materials Co. v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811, 114 S.E.2d 29 (1960) the Georgia Supreme
Court responded to a claim that they should invalidate a zoning ordinance by first
observing that the people of the state by adopting a constitutional amendment au-
thorizing the General Assembly to enact legislation to permit local governments to
zone and district the use of land had "voluntarily subjected their property to unlimited
control and regulation of legislative departments." Id. at 814, 114 S.E.2d at 31-32.
Then, after quoting the constitutional provision and the implementing statute, the
court states:
It would seen) that the foregoing quotations from the Constitution and the
statutes demonstrate plainly that the county commissioners have c omplete
freedom to create any number of zones and districts and qf such size and
shape as they may arbitrarily choose. This means they have authority to create zones
or districts of any size, whether 10 feet square or any number of acres in any con-
ceivable shape.
Id. at 815-16, 114 S.E.2d at 32 (emphasis added). This complete deference to local
government decisions was hedged only slightly in a recent decision, Cross v. Hall
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County, 238 Ga. 709, 235 S.E.2d 379 (1977), wherein the court indicated that anything
in the Griffin case contrary to the following statement was overruled: "When neighbors
of rezoned property challenge the rezoning in court on its merits, it will be set aside
only if fraud or corruption is shown or the rezoning power is being manifestly abused
to the oppression of the neighbors." Id. at 711, 235 S.E.2d at 382. If these judicial
attitudes continue and the General Assembly remains constitutionally restrained from
intervening, exclusionary practices will undoubtedly flourish in Georgia.
124 Exclusionary practices are also prevalent among Illinois local governments.
A Zoning Laws Study Commission created in 1969 by the Illinois legislature, Act of
Sept. 16, 1969, Ill. Pub. Law 76-1344 (N.B. 179), undertook several surveys, three of
which are of particular interest. One was concerned with large lot zoning. After decid-
ing that a 5,000 to 6,000 square foot lot was the size of a lot needed to construct a
reasonably priced single-family residence, the Commission through a survey discovered
that fifty-eight percent of the land zoned residential in urban communities was zoned
to require minimum lot sizes in excess of the needed lot size. Dep't of Urban and
Regional Planning, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Zoning Problems,
Supplementary Statistical Report for the Illinois Zoning Laws Study Commission 19
(1971). In urban counties the percentage of land so zoned jumped to seventy percent.
Id. at 20. Another survey found that mobile homes were not permitted in fifty-seven
percent of the Illinois local governments that had adopted a comprehensive plan and
that in those which permitted mobile homes, slightly more than eighty percent permit-
ted them only in commercial or industrial zones. Id. at 31. The third survey which
polled local government officials to determine whether they thought zoning was "fair
to all" found that seventy-five percent thought it was or had no opinion on the matter.
This response by local government officials suggests they arc not aware of the adverse
impacts of exclusionary practices on regional housing needs. Id. at 39. In light of the
considerable publicity exclusionary practices have received in the ensuing decade, the
validity of this survey as far as the perceptions of local government officials today is
highly questionable.
After its study, the Commission made a variety of recommendations to the legisla-
ture including one which would reverse the traditional presumption in favor of the
validity of local government actions "when such actions results in a denial of housing
opportunity to persons employed within a jurisdiction and when there is a demonstra-
ble need fir such housing within the jurisdiction." Bureau of Urban and Regional
Planning Research, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Zoning Laws Study
Coninfn Rep. 147 (1971). The Illinois legislature adopted none of the Commission's
recommendations. A survey of existing Illinois legislation reveals only one act that is of
significance to the present inquiry. The Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111-1/2, §§ 711 et seq.
(Smith-Hurd 1977), after recognizing the role mobile homes could play in alleviating
the serious shortage of low and moderate income housing in Illinois, authorizes the
Department of Health to approve and license mobile home parks. Id. at § 715. Be-
cause the Act makes such parks subject to local zoning ordinances and building codes,
it appears to be a rather innocuous piece of legislation. Yet, the Act when coupled with
certain judicial decisions affords at least limited control over local exclusionary prac-
tices.
With regard to the exclusion of mobile homes, an intermediate appellate court of
Illinois decided in High Meadows Park, Inc. v. City of Aurora. 112 Ill. App. 2d 220.
250 N.E.2d 517 (1969), that a city ordinance which expressly prohibited any trailer
parks within the city was void because municipalities lacked the authority to exclude a
lawful business. Shortly thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court in City of Sparta v.
Brenning, 45 359, 259 N.E.2d 30 (1970), voided an ordinance, in a city without
a zoning ordinance, that attempted to exclude all trailers except those located within a
trailer park. More recently, an intermediate appellate court in Oak Forest Mobile
Home Park, Inc. v. City of Oak Forest, 27 Ill. App. 3d 303, 326 N.E.2d 473. (1975)
decided that a city with a zoning ordinance could not exclude mobile homes by either
failing to provide locations fur mobile home parks or expressly excluding them. Thus.
communities in Illinois must make at least limited provisions for one form of low and
moderate income housing.
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promulgated some policies designed to cope with the problem of local
exclusionary land use practices. California exemplifies such states.
B. California
Although many California communities employ exclusionary land use
planning practices, recent enactments by the California legislature impose
both actual and potential barriers to a continuation of these practices. The
California Supreme Court also has imposed certain barriers that such com-
munities must scale if they are to continue such practices. In addition, some
California communities have enacted programs designed to encourage mixed
income housing. All of these affirmative actions have followed in the wake of
a dire housing problem in California.
The housing shortage in California has reached a crisis level. More than
one million new housing units need to he constructed within the next five
years to accommodate new households and to replace units lost from the
housing stock. 125 In addition, another one million units need to be rehabili-
tated if all Californians are to have decent housing available.' 21i Eighty per-
cent of those needing new housing or rehabilitated housing are low or mod-
erate income persons, that is. earn less than eighty percent of the median
income in California. 12 ' More than 1,765000 households, which constitute
approximately twenty-three percent of all households, presently are overpay-
ing for their housing. 128 Although the construction industry may meet some
of this need, particularly for new housing, 129 it is unlikely to be able to satisfy
a substantial portion of the general need in the absence of considerable gov-
ernmental financial aid.'"
Beyond these mobile homes cases the Illinois judiciary has been for less aggressive
in striking exclusionary practices. Their tone was established in Honeck v. County of
Cook, 12 III. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1975) wherein a five acre minimal lot require-
ment was attacked as being an unconstitutional taking. The court placed great weight
on the presumption of the validity of zoning ordinances and found the ordinance valid
because there was testimony that the land was hilly and full of ravines and that there
was a market for five acre tracts which supported the reasonableness of the ordinance.
See also De Bruler Homes, Inc. v. County of Lake, 78 111, App. 2c1 177, 222 N.E.2d 689
(1966).
Although the legislation and ,judicial decisions concerning mobile homes reflect
some sensitivity to the exclusionary land use planning problem, they fall far short of
reflecting any real commitment by the authoritative decision makers of Illinois to al-
leviate the plight of low and moderate income families seeking housing in Illinois.
125 Comment, California Lower Income Housing Policy. At Legislative and judicial
Crossroads, 29 HAsTINGs Li. 793, 811 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
125 Id .
"7 I). BRYANT, J. SOLO WAY, C. CHIU, CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL LOWER INCOME
HOUSING LAws: A COMPLICATION AND ANALYSIS 18-1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
BRYANT & SoLowAYI.
128 Id .
129 Although the low and moderate income households may not be able to
afford the new housing, they may he able to afford the housing vacated by those
purchasing the new housing.
'"" See Comment, supra note 125, at 811.
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In recent years a substantial number of local governments in California
have enacted exclusionary ordinances. 131 Some have acted out of environ-
mental concern, some to preserve the character of their community, and some
specifically to exclude low income families and racial minorities. 132 More re-
cently, many have increased their charges for planning and permit fees, and
have imposed "impact taxes" on new construction in order to replace revenue
lost as the result of Proposition 13. 133 These exclusionary practices undoubt-
edly have exacerbated the low and moderate income housing crisis in Califor-
nia. The California constitutional provision, upheld by the Supreme Court in
James v. Vallierra, 134 requiring a referendum before a local government. could
undertake a public housing project, also has contributed to the crisis. The
electors of the various local governments in California rejected forty-eight
percent of all the proposed projects between 1951 and 1974. 1 "
In 1965 the California legislature enacted a new planning and zoning law
pursuant to which all local governments must adopt a general plan.' One
of the mandatory elements of the general plan is a housing element wherein
the local government must make "adequate provision for the housing needs
of all economic segments of the community." 137
 Although the legislation is
mandatory, local governments in California were slow in responding to the
legislative mandate. 138 Even when they responded, there was no assurance
that the housing plan accurately reflected the housing needs of the commu-
nity much less those of the region in which it is located: 3" In addition, this
planning legislation imposes no obligation on the local governments to take
affirmative action to provide low and moderate income housing. 140
Apparently because of the recalcitrance of the local governments and the
ever increasing shortage of low and moderate income houSing, the California
legislature in 1975 created the State Department of Housing and Community
Development. 141
 One of the major tasks of this agency was the preparation
and adoption of regulations applicable to the housing element. of a local gov-
ernment's general plan. 1 a 2
 According to the regulations subsequently
adopted by this agency, a local government's housing element must contain
(1) a survey of both market rate and non-market rate housing needs (2) a
131 For an identification and outline of some of these, see Clark & Grable,
Growth Control in California:  Prospects for Local Government Implementation of Timing and
Sequential Control of Residential Development, 5 PAC. L.J. 570, 595-602 (1974).
132 Id. at 572.
133 Letter from	 Soloway, Office of Planning and Research, State of Califor-
nia (Dec. 14, 1978) on file at the author's office, Tulane University.
134 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
'" BRYANT & SOLOwAY, Supra note 127, at 3-36. This trend was reversed in
1976 when the electors approved 24 out of 36 proposed projects, but this reversal in
the trend must be weighed in light. of the fact. that most of the proposals were to
provide housing for the elderly. Id.
' 36 CM.. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (Deering 1974).
' 37 CAL. Gov't . Cons: '§ 65302(c) (Deering•Supp, 1978).
13 " See Continent, supra note 125, at 796.
130 Id .
1411
' 4 ' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODES §§ 50400 et seq. (Deering 1978).
142 Id. at	 50459.
326	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:301
statement of the locality's housing goals and policies and (3) a description of
the course of action which the locality intends to pursue in its achievement of
the stated goals and policies. "3
 Although the regulations require the locality
to use its police powers that affect housing, such as land-use controls, in a
manner compatible with its housing policies and goals, they do not require a
locality to undertake "economically infeasible" programs. 144
 The regulations
do require the housing element to take into account market area needs. 145
The ultimate effectiveness of this program hinges to a high degree on
the remedies available to the agency if a locality refuses to file a housing
element or files an inadequate housing element. The agency has not yet de-
termined what it will do when these situations arise.'"
In 1979 the California legislature enacted several provisions that reflect
its continuing concern about exclusionary practices in the state. One provision
added a requirement that a community when developing the housing element
of its general plan must consider "not only site-built housing, but also man-
ufactured housing, including mobile homes and modular homes." 197 Another
provision, which is specifically designed to "contribute significantly to the
economic feasibility of low- and moderate-income housing in proposed hous-
ing developments," 148 requires communities to grant one or more bonuses to
developers building five or more units who agree to provide at least 25 per-
cent of their units to low- and moderate-income families.'" The community
must grant either a density bonus defined as a density of at least 25 percent
or more than the density permitted by the applicable zoning ordinance. Or if
a density bonus is not granted, the community must grant two or more other
bonuses such as exemption from park and recreational dedication or in lieu
of payment requirements anti exemption from public improvements require-
ments such as those requiring construction of streets, sidewalks, and sewers.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the legislature enacted a provision re-
quiring communities to consider the effects of land-use planning ordinances
"on the housing needs of the region in which the local jurisdiction is situated
and balance these needs against the public service needs of its residents and
available fiscal and financial resources." 1 ' 0
 These provisions reflect at least
some commitment by the California legislature to eliminate exclusionary prac-
tices, but only the future will reveal whether they will actually force recalci-
143
 See BRYANT & SOLOWAY, supra note 127, at 2-10. These regulations are
printed in 25 CAL, AD. CODE §§ 6400 et seq.
144
 Id. at 2-12.
145 Id .
146
 Id. at 2-9.
147
 Cal. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c) (Deering Supp. 1980).
148 CAL. Gov't. CODE § 65917 (Deering Supp. 1980).
14°
 CAL. GOVT CODE § 65915 (Deering Supp. 1980).
15° CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65863.5 (Deering Supp. 1980). This statute also at-
tempts to place some controls on Petaluma type plans, see text and accompanying
notes infra at notes 176-180. It provides:, "Any ordinance adopted pursuant to this ,
chapter which, by its terms, limits the number of housing units which may be con-
structed on an annual basis shall contain findings as to the public health, safety, and
welfare of the city or county to be promoted by the adoption of the ordinance which
justify reducing the housing opportunities of the region."
January 19801	 EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE PLANNING	 327
trant local governments to eliminate such practices. The effectiveness of these
provisions hinges to a large extent on the willingness of the Department of
Housing and Community Development and the 'courts to scrutinize local plans
closely and reject local plans that only feign compliance with these new re-
quirements. if they fail to so scrutinize local plans, the legislature, if it is in
fact committed to the elimination of exclusionary practices, may be forced to
increase the authority of the Department of Housing and Community De-
velopment. with regard to the elimination of exclusionary plans. Although one
can think of a variety of ways in which the California legislation and regula-
tions could be modified to make them more effective,'" this effort indicates
that the California legislature is willing, at, least at present,' to shoulder
some responsibility for the elimination of exclusionary practices.
The same can he said about the judiciary in California. The primary
example of this willingness is found in Associated Home Builders v. City of Liver-
more. ' 53. Through an initiative procedure, the City of Livermore enacted an
ordinance which prohibits the issuance of building permits until the city's
educational facilities, sewage treatment capacities, and water supplies meet.
specified standards.'" With respect to the allegation that the ordinance in-
fringed migrants' constitutional right of travel, the court determined that the
"indirect" burden which this ordinance imposed on the right to travel did not
justify the application of the compelling state interest standard required when
there is a "direct" abridgment of' the right to travel. The court noted that the
ordinance impartially prohibits all residential construction, expensive and in-
expensive, and therefore, does not single out racial minorities or the poor for
differential treatment. It concluded that the appropriate test to apply in the
case was the less stringent one "which inquires whether the ordinance reason-
ably relates to the welfare of those whom it significantly affects... 155 In the
next sentence, however, the court expanded the scope of those who must be
considered: "[I]f, as alleged here, the ordinance may strongly influence the
supply and distribution of housing for an entire metropolitan region, judicial
inquiry must consider the welfare of that region." 15 ''
151 For example, to ensure implementation of adequate housing elements,
legislation could confer authority on the State Department of Housing and Commun-
ity Development to prepare and implement, by repealing or amending restrictive ordi-
nances, housing elements when local governments refuse to prepare an adequate plan.
This suggestion may pose a home rule question under CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5. It is,
however, difficult to believe that housing in the present state of affairs can be deemed
a "municipal affair." See Birkenfeld v. Berkeley, 17 Ca1.3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001. 130
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976) (holding rent control eviction procedures not a municipal affair).
112 The California legislature recently has considered several bills designed to
weaken the program outlined in the text. See Comment, supra note 125, at 802-03.
Whether the legislature will hold firm in its position, particularly in view of the fiscal
pressures on local governments as a result of Proposition 13, appears doubtful.
152 18 Ca1.3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
154 For a discussion of the reasons why. this ordinance was adopted and its
content, see Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore,
California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 12-14, 22-24 (1974).
"5 18 Ca1.3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
156 Id. (emphasis added).
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When employing this test, a trial court should employ a three step proc-
ess. First, it should forecast the duration of the growth controls and the con-
trols' probable effects. 157
 Second, it should identify the competing interests
affected by the ordinance, for example, conflicts between the interest of resi-
dents in environmental protection and the interest of outsiders who are faced
with a growing housing shortage.
'' " Third, the court should "determine
whether the ordinance, in light of its probable impact, represents a reasonable
accommodation of the competing in terests." 5" In making this final determi-
nation, the court should make sure that the ordinance bears a "real and sub-
stantial relation to the public welfare."'" This almost suggests a presumption
against controlled growth ordinances, but the California Supreme Court was
unwilling to establish, at least, explicitly, such a presumption. 10
 Justice Mosk
in his dissenting opinion, however, was willing to presume that absolute pro-
hibitions against new residential construction are invalid, and that regulations
imposing limits on population growth are invalid unless the community will
absorb its reasonable share of the region's needs."'
Although many California local governments are engaging in exclusion-
ary practices, some have undertaken inclusionary practices, that. is, practices
designed to encourage mixed income housing in their community. '"'a One of
the first communities to adopt such a program was Los Angeles."' A brief
description of its ordinance will present an outline of what these communities
are seeking to accomplish. The ordinance provides that all new housing de-
velopments of five or more units must. make a diligent effort to include units
affordable by lower income families. 1"5
 If the developer is unable to provide
such units, which none have been able to do,'" they must execute an agree-
ment with the Los Angeles Housing Authority wherein the developer grants
the Authority the right to lease or purchase up to fifteen percent of the units
at. market value. This permits the Authority to seek federal subsidies to make
the units available to lower income persons. In recent years, the Authority has
been able to use section 8 subsidies to make some of these units available to
such persons." 7
 Participation in the section 8 program apparently does not
157 Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
' 5 ' Id. at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
"a Id. at 609, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal, Rptr. at 56.
"a Id. at 609, 557 1 1 .2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (emphasis in original).
Hit Id.
102 Id. at 623, 557 1 1 .2c1 at 497, 135 Cal. Rptr, at 65.
163
 For a general discussion of inclusionary practices. See Kleven, I nclusionary
Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing,
21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (1974).
164 Los ANGELES, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 12.03, 12.30, 12.39, 13.04 as
amended by Ordinance No. 145, 927 Apr. 30, 1974 (reprinted in BRYANT & SOLO WAY,
supra note 127, at Appendix A).
105
 Six percent of the total number of units should be provided for low income
families and at least an additional nine percent for moderate income families. Id. at
12.39 .1.
166
 BRYANT & SOLOWAY, SUPS note 127, at 3
-28.
167 Id. The Los Angeles Housing Authority has 440 section 8 subsidies which it
plans to use in connection with the units made available through the inclusionary or-
dinance.
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fall within the constitutional referenda requirement involved in the Valtierra
case.'" 8
Two other inclusionary ordinances should be mentioned. Orange County
has a program similar to the one in Los Angeles. its program, however, is an
informal one whereby the Board of Supervisors negotiates with developers of
planned communities located in unincorporated portions of the county and
seeks to have them set aside a portion of their development for lower income
families. '9 This program is important because it offers more opportunity
for spatial deconcentration than is possible in a central city's inclusionary or-
dinance such as adopted by Los Angeles.
The City of Palo Alto has an inclusionary ordinance which applies only
to new owner occupied housing. Its plan envisions a developer selling at least
ten percent of the units constructed to lower income families at the cost of
construction."" This cost excludes land cost, profit, and marketing costs.
The program is voluntary, unless the developer needs a rezoning or a sub-
division plan approved, but participation is encouraged by offering expedited
permit procedures."' Once a developer participates, the developer must.
execute and record covenants wherein the owners of the designated units
must live on the premises, are prohibited from leasing the premises, and if
they decide to sell, must give the City or its designee the right of first refusal
at a designated price. 172 Because low income families, in the absence of addi-
tional governmental subsidies, ordinarily will be unable to purchase such
housing even at its reduced cost, this plan must be viewed as affording relief
principally for upper moderate income families.
One would be remiss in discussing local governments in California to
ignore the City of Petaluma, which is known nationally as a result of its in-
volvement in Construction Industry of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma. ' 73 In
that case the Ninth Circuit reversed a federal district court decision striking
Petaluma's growth control ordinance, which limited the annual number of res-
idential building permits that could be issued, as an infringement of nonresi-
dents' right of travel. The Ninth Circuit determined that none of the plain-
tiffs had standing to assert an infringement of the right to travel, and then
reviewed the case on the alternative argument that the limited growth ordi-
nance also violated the clue process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Re-
lying primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Belle Terre,'" the Ninth
Circuit determined that Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town character
was a "legitimate state interest" being furthered by the ordinance, and there-
fore did not violate the clue process clause.
168 Id. at 3-42.
"9 Id. at 3-28.
"° Id. at 3-30.
17t Id.
172 The price set is the original purchase price plus an increase based on the
rise in the Cost of Living Index. Id.
173 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
174 For a discussion of the Belle Terre case, see text accompanying notes 88-90
supra.
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Recently the City of Petaluma has enacted a new residential development
control ordinance I75
 and adopted an environmental design plan for 1978-
[985. 176 The ordinance was adopted to promote five policies: preserving the
quality of life in the community; protecting the green open-space frame of
'the city; insuring the adequacy of the City facilities and services within accept-
able allocation of City and school revenues; insuring a balance of housing
types and values in the City which will accommodate a variety of families
including families of moderate income and older families on limited, fixed in-
comes; and insuring the balanced development of the City, east, north, and
west of the central core.' 77 The ordinance then establishes a development
allotment system to ensure that the building permits issued in a single year
will not produce more than an annual growth rate of five percent of the city's
population. 178 Low income projects approved by the city are exempted from
the allocation system. In addition, a development is evaluated in terms of an
elaborate point system. For example, points are received for such items as
architectural design, innovative site design, or provision of open space. A de-
veloper obtains additional points if the proposed project includes either on or
off site low and moderate income housing.
Petaluma's environmental plan states a goal to he to "provide for a bal-
ance of housing types throughout the City to afford all Economic Levels hous-
ing opportunities." 17 " The plan indicates that this goal will be pursued by
providing more multi-family units, encouraging the private sector to produce
such housing, and seeking county, state, and federal financial assistance for
such housing. Although the plan seeks a balance, the residential development
ordinance, which was enacted subsequently, states that the City's policy goal
with respect to low and moderate income housing is only eight to twelve per-
cent of the annual production of housing.'" Thus, the balance is weighted
heavily in favor of middle and upper income housing. Such a low percentage
for low and moderate income housing certainly cannot he viewed as a willing-
ness to accept a fair share of the regional need for such housing when state
statistics indicate that approximately twenty-three percent of the population of
the state are low or moderate income persons.'" Petaluma's new scheme,
however, is encouraging in that it reflects local legislative sensitivity to the low
and moderate income housing problem, and thus can he viewed as inclusion-
ary, albeit in a limited form.
Unlike California, New jersey, through its stiprenie court, has under-
taken a broad attack on local exclusionary practices.
1 " PETALUMA, CAI.. MUNICIPAL CODE Ch. 17.26 as added by Ordinance No.
1321 N.C.S. Sept. 21, 1978 [hereinafter cited as PETALUMA ORDINANCE].
1 " Environmental Design Plan 1978-1985, City of Petaluma, California
adopted by Resolution No, 8174 N.C.S. April 24, 1978 (hereinafter cited as Peialuina
Plata
177 PETALUMA ORDINANCE„Clipra note 175, at Ch. 17.26.010.
178 Id. at Ch. 17.26.030.
17 " Petaluma Plan, supra note 176, at 6.
188 PETALUMA ORDINANCE, .supra note 177, at Ch. 17.26.060.
181
 BRYANT & SOLOWAY, supra note 127, at 18-1.
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C. New Jersey
In 1970, the Division of State and Regional Planning of the New Jersey
Department of Community Affairs undertook a statewide study of zoning in
New Jersey. 182 The study focused on 1.7 million acres of developable
land 183 and found that 8 1 .7% of this land was zoned for residential use, thus
suggesting an ample supply of land in New Jersey for residential develop-
ment.` 84 It then analyzed this residential zoning to determine how much
land was zoned for multi-family dwellings, how much was zoned to permit
mobile homes, what were the minimum lot sizes permitted, and what were the
minimum floor areas required.'" The findings of the Planning Division
must be viewed as shocking when considered in light of another study it pre-
pared which revealed that between 1970 and 1980 an additional three
hundred thousand low and moderate income housing units would be needed
in New Jersey.'" The zoning study found that only six percent of the resi-
dential land was zoned for multi-family dwellings.'" This figure is mislead-
ing because most of the land so zoned was located in six rural municipalities
which would absorb little growth. If land in those municipalities was excluded,
then only one percent of the land zoned residential in areas where growth
was most. likely to occur was set aside for multi-family dwellings.'"
Even this incredible figure fails to reveal the whole truth. The study
found that the zoning ordinances contained multi-dwelling bedroom restric-
tions, which meant that fifty-nine percent of the multi-family dwelling units
had to be one bedroom or efficiency apartments. 181 ' Mobile homes suffered
an even worse fate. Only one-tenth of one percent. of developable land in
New Jersey was zoned for mobile homes.'" As one might suspect., these
exclusionary practices were accompanied by zoning ordinances establishing
I " See Division of State and Regional Planning, Dept. of Community Affairs,
State of New Jersey, Land Use Regulation: The Residential Land Supply (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Land Use Regulation].
183 Id. at 5. The study covered all the state except five counties—Atlantic, Cape
May, Cumberland, Salem, and Hudson—the first four are primarily rural and would
not be subjected to pressures for extensive residential development in the near future
and Hudson County is virtually all developed. Id. at 4. Developable land included all
land in the remaining 16 counties in New Jersey that was capable of being developed.
It excluded land that was already developed, incapable of being developed, or owned
by federal, state, or local governments. Id. at 5 n.2.
184 Id. at 6.
1 " The study also examined minimum frontage requirements and found that
only 13.5 percent of the land permitted lots of less than 100 feet in width. Id. at 17.
(32.2 percent required widths between 100-149 feet; 23.3 percent required widths be-
tween 150-199 feet; and 31.percent required widths in excess of 200 feet. Id. at 17A.)
These figures further substantiate a conclusion that low and moderate income families
were being choked by exclusionary practices in New Jersey.
18 " See New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning, A Revised State-
wide Housing Allocation Report for New Jersey 8 (May 1978).
187 Land Use Regulation, supra note 182, at 10.
188 Id.
1 " Id. at II.
1111
 Id. at 13.
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sizeable minimum lot sizes. Almost fifty-five percent of the developable single
family residential land supply was in a zone requiring one to slightly less than
three acres."' Only slightly more than five percent was zoned to permit
single family dwellings on lots of one-quarter acre or less. 112
 Employing cer-
tain health standards, 1 ' the study determined that a minimum floor area of
1,150 square feet would be adequate for the average New Jersey household of
3.17 persons)" Approximately fifty-two percent of the land zoned single
family residential required floor areas in excess of 1,150 square feet.'" Al-
though this percentage is not as unsettling as the other figures, when coupled
with the other exclusionary practices, it nevertheless reveals that in 1970
exclusionary ordinances pervaded the areas of New jersey that were suscepti-
ble to growth.
Against this background of extremely widespread exclusionary practices,
the New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with a case attacking the legal-
ity of the exclusionary practices Of one township in Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel.'" Mount. Laurel, a spaisely populated
community approximately twenty miles from Camden, had increased in popu-
lation from 2,817 in 1950 to 11,221 in 1970. Sixty-five percent of the town-
ship was either vacant or in agricultural use. In 1964, the township had
enacted several devices designed to exclude low and moderate income
families. These included placing 29.2 percent. of the land in the township in
noncumulative clean industrial zones: zoning all residential areas single family
residential, thereby not allowing townhouses,'" apartments,'' 8 or mobile
homes anywhere in the township; and placing slightly more than half the
township in residential zones requiring minimum lot sizes of about one-half
acre. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that exclusionary practices,
in the absence of special circumstances, were incompatible with the New jer-
sey Constitution because they failed to promote the general welfare. It deter-
"" Id. at 15.
192 Id.
11' 3
 The Planning Division employed the recommendations of Dr. C. E.
Winslow, Professor of Public Health, Yale Medical School, presented in his testimony
in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 167, 89 A.2d 693, 695
(1952).
" 4
 Land Use Regulation, supra note 182, at 19.
'"' Id. at 20.
"" 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
" 7
 In 1968, Mount Laurel enacted an ordinance creating a cluster zone. The
court analyzed the provision of the ordinance and concluded that one-family houses,
Which were the only type of residences permitted in the zone, would he comparable in
value and character to those permitted in the other residential zones. Id. at 165, 336
A.2d at 720.
"" Between 1967 and 1971 Mount Laurel had a planned unit development
ordinance which permitted the construction of nmIti-family housing. The ordinance,
however, imposed sufficient requirements to ensure that these units would be occupied
by middle and upper middle income families, Id. at 167, 336 A.2d at 721. One of the
provisions should be mentioned. A developer was required to execute a covenant run-
ning with the land on all multi-family units providing that if more than .3 school
children per unit lived in the apartment, the developer would be responsible for the
tuition and other school expenses for any excess number of students attending school
in Mount Laurel. Id. at 168. 336 A.2d at 721-22.
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mined that the general welfare requirement could not be viewed solely from
the parochial perspective of an individual community when their actions were
having impacts beyond their boundaries. A broader view, that of the region,
must be employed. Every community in the state was required to "bear its fair
share of the regional burden." 19" The court refused to indicate what consti-
tuted a region because it believed that the composition of an appropriate re-
gion would vary from situation to situation. It stated that there is a presump-
tive obligation for every municipality: "affirmatively to plan and provide, by
its land use regulations the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety
and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing,
to meet the needs, desires, and resources of all categories of people who may
desire to live within its boundaries." 200
 Stated negatively, a municipality can-
not adopt practices that limit the variety and choice of housing.
In light of the community policies previously identified,"' the Mount
Laurel decision must be viewed as the most enlightened court decision yet to
be rendered in this country. It offers the prospect that the exclusionary walls
surrounding most New Jersey communities will he destroyed thereby dramati-
cally increasing the potential choice of residence for millions of people who
live in or near New Jersey. Such a prospect could have been enhanced further
by state legislation designed to ensure that New Jersey municipalities were
engaging in practices designed to encourage the construction of low and
moderate income housing and not engaging in exclusionary practices." 2 Al-
though the New jersey legislature enacted a new Municipal Land Use Law the
year following the Mount Laurel decision, the legislation fails to provide any
devices, such as state-wide or regional surveillance of and control over local
land use practices, designed to implement the Mount Laurel decision in a more
efficient and effective manner than a series of cases attacking local practices.
This failure is particularly disappointing in light of ,
 one of the legislation's
avowed purposes: "To ensure that the development of individual
municipalities does not conflict with the development and general welfare of
neighboring municipalities, the county and the state as a whole."'"
In two subsequent decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court further
clarified the scope and content of its Mount Laurel decision. In Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison 214 the court rejected the argument that it
should - abandon its holding in Mount Laurel because the actual production of
substantial amounts of low and moderate income housing as a result of
municipalities rezoning land within their boundaries to accommodate such
housing was highly unlikely in view of the current economy, and thus judicial
enforcement of the Mount Laurel decision would be futile. After noting that it
was fully aware that substantial amounts of such housing would probably re-
quire govenmental subsidies or external incentives to private enterprise, the
court observed: "it is incumbent on the governing body to adjust its zoning
199 Id. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733.
2" Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728.
2 " See text preceding note 43 supra.
202 N.J.cj STAT. ANN. §§ 40:550-1 et seq. (Stipp. 1978).
203
 Id. at § 40:550-2d.
2"4 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d at 1192 (1977).
334	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:301
regulations so as to render possible and feasible the least cost' housing, consis-
tent with minimum standards of health and safety, which private industry will
undertake, and in amounts sufficient to satisfy the deficit in the hypothesized
fair share." 2 " 5
 In order to ensure that. each municipality in New Jersey pro-
vides its fair share of least cost housing, the court determined that each
municipality must overzone for such housing. The court. believed such over-
zoning was necessary to increase the possibility that least cost housing would
be produced because in many instances land zoned for such housing may not
be used for such purposes, at least not, within the needed period of time. 206
Although the court refused to impose an affirmative duty on
municipalities to create low and moderate income housing because it felt there
was no legal basis for such an imposition:2 " it did require developing
municipalities to employ density bonuses in their zoning ordinances.'" The
required density bonus is the type wherein a developer would be permitted to
build additional one bedroom or efficiency apartments for each. three or four
bedroom apartment included in the complex. 20" The court believed that this
type of incentive to developers would encourage them to build the type of
housing required by many km and moderate income families.'"
In Pascack Ass'n u. Mayor of Washington, 2 " the township's zoning ordinance
was attacked on the grounds that it failed to provide for multi-family housing.
The township contended that it had no obligation to provide for multi-family
housing because it was a small municipality substantially developed with de-
tached single-family residences and thus was not a "developing" municipality
discussed in Mount Laurel. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the
township:
[M]aintaining the character of a fully developed, predominately
single-family residential community constitutes an appropriate de-
sideratum of zoning to which a municipal governing body may
legitimately give substantial weight in arriving at a policy legislative
decision as to whether, or to what extent, to admit multi-family hous-
ing in such vacant land areas as remain in such a community. 212
205
 Id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
2" Id. at 519, 371 A.2d at 1210-11.
2 " Id. at 546, 371 A.2d at 1224-25.
2" Id. at 517-18, 371 A.2d at 1210.
2"
 The court also discussed an ordinance requiring a mandatory percentage of
moderately priced dwellings to be included within each subdivision or multi-family
unit. Because the court had serious doubts about the legality of such an ordinance in
the absence of express legislative authorization, it was unwilling to impose an obliga-
tion on municipalities to enact such an ordinance. Id. at 518, 371 A.2d at 1210.
21 " The court again refused to accept a formulaic approach to the determina-
tion of the appropriate region from which a municipality should absorb its fair share
of low and moderate income housing. Id. at 539, 371 A.2d at 1221. With respect to
Madison Township, it believed that the county in which it is located was not an ap-
propriate region, rather that the area from which people would move to Madison
Township in light of available transportation and employment opportunities was the
appropriate region. Id. at 537, 371 . A.2d at 1219.
2"
 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2c1 6 (1977).
212 Id. at 483-84, 379 A.2d at 13.
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Although the court. continuously employed the phrase "developing municipal-
ity" in Mount LaureL 2 ' 3 Pascack reflects an unnecessary retreat from the Mount
Laurel philosophy. A more acceptable approach would have been to require
such communities to absorb their fair share of low and moderate income
housing to the maxitnum extent possible.'" Such a decision would have pre-
vented exclusionary pockets throughout New Jersey. It also would minimize
the number of additional low and moderate income housing units developing
communities will have to absorb 215 and would achieve a better spatial decon-
centration of such housing which should be viewed as a desirable goal.
A recent study 211' prepared by the New Jersey Division of State and Re-
gional Planning pursuant to gubernatorial executive order 2 " should aid the
state's judiciary in implementing the Mount Laurel decision. The study, after
ascertaining the state's probable need for low and moderate income housing
between 1970 and 1990, identifies twelve sub-state regions for housing alloca-
tions.'" It then determines the housing needs of each region and ultimately
of each municipality of each region. 219 In allocating the prospective housing
needs among the municipalities of a region, the study considered each munic-
ipality in terms of its vacant developable land, employment growth, municipal
fiscal capability and personal income. 2 " The allocation arrived at on the
basis of these criteria was then adjusted on the basis of the municipalities'
present share of low and moderate income housing and its ability to absorb
additional housing. 221 This study could operate as the foundation for estab-
213
 67 N.J. 151, 173, 179, 180, 185, 188, 190, 336 A.2d 713, 724, 727, 728,
731, 732, 733.
214 For a similar suggestion, see Judge Pashman's dissenting opinion, 74 N.J.
496-505, 379 A.2d 19-24.
213 A developing community after Pascack will have to absorb not only its "fair
share" of the region's housing needs, but also a portion of each developed commu-
nity's fair share in order for the region as a whole to absorb all of the housing de-
mands. This will place an additional strain on the fiscal resources of developing
municipalities and undoubtedly make the Mount Laurel decision even less politically
popular. This may cause some communities to try to delay or thwart the Mount Laurel
decision to a larger extent than they would if they believed all municipalities were
being treated equally.
216 New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning, A Revised Statewide
Housing Allocation Report for New Jersey (1978) [hereinafter cited as Revised Hous-
ing Allocation Report].
217 Govenor Byrne issued Executive Order No. 35 (April 2, 1976) directing the
Division of State and Regional Planning to prepare a statewide housing allocation plan.
A preliminary plan was completed in December, 1976. This plan was referred to in
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 531 n.37, 371 A.2d
1192, 1217 n.37 (1977). When Governor Byrne released the preliminary report, he
issued Executive Order No. 46 (Dec. 8, 1976), requiring a modification to take into
account current programs designed to revitalize the cities in New Jersey and rede-
velopment opportunities for such cities. The Revised Housing Allocation Report, supra
note 216, was produced as a result of this second Executive Order.
218 With the exception of two regions, the report identifies most counties as
being their own region. Region 11 consists of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex,
Morris, Passaic, Somerset, and Union Counties. Region 12 consists of Burlington,
Camden, and Gloucester Counties. Housing Allocation Report, supra note 216, at 13.
219 Id. at App. A.
22 ° Id. at 15-17.
221 Id. at 20.
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fishing a prima facie case that a municipality has or has not made adequate
provision for its fair share of least cost housing. 222
 Such a prima facie case
could be overcome by a demonstration that the study made an error with
respect to a particular municipality.
It is interesting to note the study's indication that Mount Laurel should
provide 1,445 additional low and moderate income housing units by 1990.223
The study confirms the supreme court's decision in Oakwood at Madison since
it indicates that. Madison Township (now Old Bridge Township) needs to pro-
vide 4,684 such units. 224
 'But the study also suggests that the court's conclu-
sion in Pascack was erroneous by indicating that, even when vacant. developa-
ble land and the community's ability to absorb additional housing are taken
into account, Washington Township should provide 464 low and moderate
income housing units by 1990.225
A scanning of the study's statistics with respect to the population and
vacant, developable land of the municipalities in the same region as
Washington Township, reveals several other municipalities in the region with
approximately the same population and remaining developable land. 226 A
scan also reveals several municipalities with no developable land. 227
 When
these two types of municipalities are withdrawn From the pool of those that
must absorb their share of least cost housing, it is apparent that the remaining
"developing" municipalities must bear the brunt of a substantial amount of
the region's fair share of such housing. This means that there will probably be
a concentration of such housing in a few portions of the region. Such a con-
centration could produce "suburban slums" comparable in most respects to
present "urban slums." If this occurs, Mount Laurel must he viewed as a deci-
sion holding out false promises and hopes.
Recently, in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laure/, 22 " the revision of Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance which purported to
comply with the supreme court's decision was assailed as not being in com-
pliance with the decision. Mount Laurel had determined its present fair share
of low and moderate income housing to be 103 units, 36 attributable to oc-
cupied substandard housing and 67 resident "financially deficient" families. It
projected its need by the year 2000 to be 515 units and adopted a "housing
timetable" which projected a need, over and above the present need, of seven-
2"
 In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison. 72 N.J. 481, 538,
371 A.2d 1192, 1220 (1977), The New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that it might
give prima facie judicial acceptance to official fair share housing plans prepared by a
group of counties or municipalities. It appears that a statewide agency study would be
equally, if not more, valuable to the judiciary.
223
 Revised Housing Allocation Report, supra note 216, at App. A, 36.
224 Id. at App. A, 25.
223 Id. at App. A, 21.
226
 Washington Township's 1970 population was 10,577 and it has 191 acres of
developable land. Other municipalities with comparable statistics include Park Ridge
Borough, River Vale Township, Westwood Borough, West Caldwell Borough, and
Monroe Township. Id. at App. D, 11-20.
227
 There are 39 such municipalities listed. Id. at App. D, 1-23.
226 161 N.J. Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (1978).
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teen units per year for the next five years. These figures contrast sharply with
the 1.445 figure found in the state study.
Mount Laurel amended its zoning ordinance to provide zones For such
units. The ordinance rezoned only twenty acres of the township's 14,300
acres, and each tract of land placed in one of three new zones was owned by a
single owner."" One zone, R-5, permitted the construction of ten units per
acre. This zone, which was carved out of an industrial zone, was thirteen acres
in size and located in a swampy area presently covered with rank and dense
underbr ► sh. 2" Another zone, R-6, permits the construction of single-family
residences on 6,000 square foot lots. The zone covers 7.45 acres of land with
all but 1.25 acres being in either a flood plain or in the path of a proposed
route For a high speed commuter rail line. The third new zone, R-7, permits a
developer to opt to exempt 10% of a planned unit development in which
certain conditions otherwise applicable to such developments would be
waived. Testimony revealed that prices of such units would be approximately
$27,000 for a one-bedroom, $33,000 for a two-bedroom, $36,500 for a
three-bedroom, and $37,500 for a four-bedroom. The planner for Mount
Laurel contended that these units were least cost housing. The ordinance also
contained "control provisions." One of these provisions tied Mount Laurel's
provision of a fair share of least cost housing to other municipalities in the
county fulfilling the same obligation. Another of these provisions required a
developer to make a Traffic Impact Study, a Municipal Services Study, an
Economic Cost-Benefit Study, an Environmental Impact Study, and an Impact.
on Fair Share Allocation.
The trial court accepted Mount Laurel's determination of its fair share
because such a determination is "a legislative rather than a judicial lune-
tion.”"' The court also accepted the three new zones as being compatible
with the New jersey Supreme Court's NIount Laurel decision. 232 These two
portions of the decision, if permitted to stand make a mockery of the fair
share concept enunciated in the supreme court's Mount Laurel decision. They
will permit municipalities to feign compliance with Mount Laurel while effec-
tively retaining their exclusionary walls. Thus, only a small trickle of least cost
housing will be built in developing communities in New jersey. Most of the
remainder of the decision, however, must he applauded. It strikes all of the
"control provisions" as being incompatible with the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in Mount Laurel. In addition, the court refused to follow
Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 2 " 3 a 1962 New Jersey Supreme Court decision
upholding the ability of a municipality to exclude mobile homes, on the
229 161 N.J. Super. at 333, 391 A.2d at 944.
23 ° Id. at 334, 391 A.2d at 944. The planner for the township justified the
selection of this site on the grounds that it affords easy access to employment oppor-
tunites. Id. at 338, 391 A.2d at 946..
231 Id. at 344, 391 A.2d at 949.
232 The court states: "I am convinced that Mount Laurel has sought to exercise
that function in good faith and with the express intent of compliance with the re-
quirements of the court." Id. A more accurate statement would have been: Mount
Laurel had made an effort to see how little it could do and be found in compliance
with the decision.
233 37 N.J. Super. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
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grounds that social, economic, and technological changes have occurred since
Vickers which make it no longer controlling authority. The court emphasized
that mobile homes are an extremely important method of providing standard
and economically feasible low and moderate income housing. The mobile
home issue was raised by an intervenor in the suit who had purchased a 107
acre tract of land for the purpose of developing a mobile home park. The
court directed the appropriate authorities in Mount Laurel to review the in-
tervenor's application for a mobile home park, and required them to give
written reasons for any conditions they imposed on the development of the
park. 234
 The practical effect of this portion of the opinion may be to force
Mount Laurel to accept a fair share of the region's low and moderate income
housing in numbers approaching those reflected in the state study which are,
of course, far in excess of those indicated in the Mount Laurel study.
Unless the Pascack decision and the initial portion of the recent trial
court's decision in Mount Laurel II signal a judicial retreat from the original
Mount Laurel decision, New jersey could become a model for all states in the
elimination of exclusionary ordinances. All that is needed is legislation, which
the New jersey Supreme Court has requested, 235 conferring authority on a
state administrative agency to review municipal land use plans to ensure that
they provide sufficient developable lands for least cost housing to absorb their
fair share of low and moderate income housing. If a municipality has not
provided sufficient developable lands, the state agency would so notify them
and give them the opportunity to cure the deficiency. If the municipality fails
to provide sufficient developable land within a reasonable period of time, the
state agency would have the authority and power to modify the local ordi-
nance to the extent necessary to provide such lands or seek judicial enforce-
ment of their determination. In contrast to the New jersey legislature, the
Oregon legislature has been active in attempting to eliminate local exclusion-
ary land use practices.
D. Oregon
Although statewide statistics are not available, a recent study of zoning in
the Portland metropolitan area undertaken by 1000 Friends of Oregon 236 in-
dicates that exclusionary practices are fairly widespread. The study found that
ninety-three percent of the vacant developable land was zoned for single fam-
ily residences with the average minimum lot size being in excess of 12,000
square feet. 237 Because seven percent. of the land is zoned for multi-family
residentia1, 23 " the communities in Oregon can be viewed as less exclusionary
than those in other states. 239
 Yet, the seven percent figure must be viewed in
234 161 N.J. Super. at 359-60, 391 A.2d at 957,
235 See Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 534-35, 371
A.2d 1192, 1218-19 (1977).
236 1000 FRIENDS or OREGON, VACANT LAND STUDY PORTLAND METROPOLITAN
AREA (Oct. 6, 1978 prepared by Mielke) [hereinafter cited as VACANT LAND STUDS'',
237
 Id. at 6.
236 Id. at 7.
236 See, e.g., Division of State and Regional Planning, Dept. of Community Af-
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light of the need for multi-family dwellings in the area. A Portland regional
planning agency estimated a need for 82,513 new multi-family units between
1978 and 2000 in the Portland metropolitan area. 240 The land presently
zoned multi-family can accommodate a maximum of 38,669 such units, or
only forty-seven percent of the estimated need. 24 ' These figures suggest that
Oregon will be facing a critical shortage of housing in the not too distant
future.
Other recent figures indicate the scope of the housing crisis. Research by
the State Housing Division revealed that the median cost of a house in Ore-
gon in 1977 was $50,000. 242 it is estimated that fewer than twenty-three
percent of Oregon's households can afford a $50,000 house. 242 The least
expensive house available was $35.000. 244 Only forty-five percent of all Ore-
gon households can afford even this minimum priced house. 245 One com-
mentator states that local land use plans in the Portland area add $10,000 to
the cost of a house in the area. 24" The same commentator contends that
even if large lot zoning is excluded, "unjustified subdivision procedures, de-
lays and fees may have added another $5,460 to the cost of an average
single-family home." 247 The high cost of housing in Oregon affects not only
those buying a house but also those renting. The average monthly rental for a
new two-bedroom apartment in 1978 was estimated at $255. 24 Almost half
of the renters in Oregon would be "overpaying" if they rented such an
apartment. 24" In fact, it is estimated that about 100,000 Oregon renters are
already overpaying for their rental units. 25 "
In 1973, the Oregon legislature enacted legislation substantially increas-
ing the role of state government in Oregon's land use planning processes. 251
A Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) was estab-
lished 252 which has several duties, including the establishment of statewide
planning goals and guidelines. 253 The legislation requires all cities and coun-
ties in the state to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans and to implement
them by enacting zoning, subdivision regulations, or other ordinances. 254
Each city's and county's plan and ordinances must he consistent with the
LCDC's statewide planning goals:255 To ensure this consistency, the Oregon
24"
	
LAND STUDY, supra note 236, at 1.
241 Id .











2" OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005 et seq. (1977).
252 Id. at § 197.030.
253 Id. at § 197.040(2)(a) & (d).
234 Id. at § 197.175(2).
255*/d. at § 197.250.
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legislature granted authority to LCDC to review local plans and implementing
ordinances to determine if they conflict with statewide planning goals. 256. If
LCDC determines that a local plan or program conflicts with statewide plan-
ning goals, LCDC can order the local government to take necessary action to
bring its plan or ordinances into conformity with statewide goals."' Those
who may request an LCDC review of a local plan or ordinance include "any
person or group of persons whose interests are substantially affected."'" An
order of LCDC is subject to limited judicial review.'"
In its first significant decision concerning a local government's com-
pliance with its housing goal, LCDC further clarified the housing goal. In
Seaman-v. City if Durham, 2" the petitioner challenged an ordinance increasing
single family minimum lot sizes from 8,000 to 15,000 square feet and increas-
ing minimum lot sizes for multi-family dwellings from 4,000 to 8,000 square
feet per dwelling unit. The city had only sixteen multiple family units. In
finding this change incompatible with the statewide housing goal, LCDC em-
phasized that "planning jurisdictions must consider the needs of the relevant
region in arriving at a fair allocation of housing types." 2 " Future implemen-
tation of the fair share concept should become relatively easy because the
LCDC staff and the Housing Division of the Department of Commerce are
jointly preparing a Housing Goal Handbook which will serve as a detailed guide
to satisfying the statewide housing goal. 262
Other significant decisions by LCDC include one invalidation of a city's
building moratorium, and another ruling that all cities must permit multi-
family dwellings and mobile home parks in some zones.' In State Housing
Council v. City af Lake Oswego, 264 LCDC considered a petition attacking a Sys-
tems Development. Charge Ordinance of the City of Lake Oswego which re-
quires a new development to pay not only the cost of services to the develop-
ment itself, but also costs for general system improvements beneficial to the
entire community. The Housing Council contended that these latter charges
256 Id. at § 197.300. In addition, the local government can seek a compliance
acknowledgment from LCDC. Id. at § 197.251. The procedures for obtaining review
have recently been amended. Fur these changes see notes 267-48 and accompanying
text infra.
257 Id. at 197.320. The commission may institute court proceedings to enforce
its orders. Id.,
258 Id. at	 197.300(d).
2 " Id. at § 197.320(3). A court can reverse, modify, or remand an order only
when it finds: (a) the order to be unlawful in substance or procedure shall not be
cause f'or reversal, modification or remand unless the court shall find that substantial
rights of any party were prejudiced thereby; or (b) the order to be unconstitutional; or
(c) the order is invalid because it exceeds the statutory authority of the agency; or (d)
the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record. Id.
26" LCDC Opinion and Final Order No. 77-025 (Feb. 24, 1978).
2 " 1 Id. at 9.
"2 Letter from David O'Brian. Housing Cost Evaluator, Department of Com-




" 4 LCDC Opinion and Final Order No. 78-030 (Aug. 9, 1979).
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were inappropriate and should be borne by the entire community. 2 " Al-
though the petition was dismissed on the grounds that the ordinance was "not
proven to be a land use action to which the statewide goal requirements ap-
ply", LCDC warned communities that ordinances, standing alone or in combi-
nation with other ordinances, that significantly increase the cost of housing
may be presumed to be incompatible with the statewide housing goal. 2 "
Since these decisions the Oregon legislature has modified the procedures
for attacking local land-use planning decisions on the grounds that they are
incompatible with state goals. A Land Use Board of Appeals, which has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all petitions attacking local land-use decisions, has been
created. 267 As to petitions reviewing decisions not involving statewide plan-
ning goals, the Board of Appeals can enter a final order which can be ap-
pealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. As to petitions contending that a
local decision is incompatible with statewide goals, the Board makes a recom-
mendation to LCDC as to what LCDC's decision should be. LCDC then makes
its decision and advises the Board which then enters a final order incorporat-
ing LCDC's decision. In either instance, the Board must enter a final order
within 90 days from the date the petition is filed. This innovative approach to
reviewing local land-use decisions should enhance the potential that exclusio-
nary local decisions will be discovered and thwarted because the Board will be
reviewing all local decisions that are attacked and thus may uncover some
exclusionary practices that have not been attacked for incompatibility with
statewide planning goals.'"
Oregon thus joins New Jersey as a state willing to assume considerable
responsibility for providing the widest possible choice of living locations to
existing and potential residents. Oregon's approach is perhaps even more en-
couraging than New jersey's because the state legislature and the agency it
created, rather than its courts, have taken the lead in attempting to eliminate
exclusionary practices. The Oregon experience indicates that state legislators
and administrators, by creating an appropriate atmosphere in the state, can
overcome the usual bitter political opposition to a fair share housing program.
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The survey of selected states indicates that exclusionary land use prac-
tices are being employed by local governments across the country. In fact,
such practices are far more common than one might suspect.. A continued
deference by the Supreme Court and Congress to local governmental au-
tonomy over exclusionary land use matters cannot help but cause more and
more local communities to engage in such practices at an ever increasing de-
gree of exclusivity. With the fiscal constraints being imposed on local govern-
ments by constitutional amendments comparable to California's Proposition
13, 2" the pressures for exclusionary practices will be even greater.
265 Id .
266 id .
2"7 1979 Or. Laws ch. 772.
268 Whether the Board has the authority to raise this issue sue sponte is unclear.
26 " See Gelfand, The Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the
Role of Local Government, 21 B.C. L. REV. (1980).
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Such continued deference may be justified if state governments are ac-
tively attempting to preclude their local governments from engaging in such
practices. Yet, an examination of the actions of representative states reveals
that few are shouldering their responsibilities in this respect. Although some,
like New Jersey and Oregon, are engaged in serious efforts to prevent their
local governments from employing exclusionary practices, several other states
like Connecticut., Georgia, and Illinois have undertaken no significant actions.
Many states fall somewhere between these two extremes. They have under-
taken some actions, but not sufficiently strong actions to predict that their
local communities will abandon their exclusionary practices in the near future.
It appears unlikely that they will undertake additional significant action in the
near future.
Because most states and their local governments are not accepting the
responsibility that the Supreme Court and Congress has been willing to per-
mit them to shoulder, the Supreme Court and Congress must bear the re-
sponsibility before the housing situation in this country passes beyond even its
present crisis level. Because the effects of local exclusionary practices tran-
scend state lines, the Constitution provides the Supreme Court with several
provisions, explicit and implicit, that it could employ to strike such practices as
unconstitutional.'" Whether the Burger Court will be willing in the not too
distant future to bear its Constitutional obligation and declare such practices
unconstitutional is questionable. Recent decisions offer little hope of this even-
tuality.
Congress is in a prime position to provide the impetus for elimination of
exclusionary practices. If the Supreme Court meets its obligation and strikes
unduly burdensome land use practices, Congressional action could aid a rapid
termination of such practices. If the Supreme Court fails to act, then Con-
gress should be willing to bear the responsibility. Several alternatives are
available. There is little doubt that Congress could constitutionally enact anti-
exclusionary legislation."' If express national goal of providing a decent
27° For example, Professor Sager suggests the applicability of the equal protec-
tion clause. See Sager, supra note I. Judge Burke relied on the right to travel in Con-
struction Ind. Ass'n of Sonoma City v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). The interstate commerce clause is
another possibility. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
27`
	 Congress chose to rely on the interstate commerce clause to support such
legislation, the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), would pose some question as to the constitutionality of Congress's
action. For a discussion of the Usery case, see Gelfand, supra note 269, at notes 51-88
and accompanying text. Although land use planning is a function that traditionally has
been performed by local governments, thus apparently bringing it within the scope of
the limitation on congressional power enunciated by the Court in Usery, it is difficult to
believe that exclusionary practices promote legitimate expectations of the citizenry of
local governments. Id. at note 80 and accompanying text. In addition, the relationship
between exclusionary practices and the undue burdens on interstate movement of
people is far more obvious and direct than that between minimum wage and
maximum hour limitations applicable to state and local governments and interstate
commerce. Therefore one can make very strong arguments that the Usery rationale
would not preclude anti-exclusionary legislation.
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home for every American is to be achieved,'" Congress must address even-
tually the exclusionary land use planning problem. Because integrated land
use planning can be performed more efficiently at the state governmental
level, legislation should be applicable only in the absence of effective state
control of the exclusionary problem. Such an approach should encourage
state legislatures to establish effective state programs designed to eliminate
exclusionary practices by their own local governments.
As a supplement to that anti-exclusionary legislation, Congress should
amend the Community Development legislation 273 to preclude any commu-
nity that engages in exclusionary practices from receiving any fu. nds under
the program. 274 As an incentive for rapid elimination of such practices, the
amendment could provide rewards to those local communities that undertake
an affirmative program to provide their fair share of their region's low and
moderate income housing. Amendments to the Community Development
legislation should be viewed as supplemental action, not as a primary method
of eliminating exclusionary practices. Because local governments can opt not
to participate in the Community Development Program, 275 many local gov-
ernments may be willing to forgo such federal funds in order to remain
exclusionary. If federal funds are to be used as a stick or a carrot in the
elimination of exclusionary practices, consideration should be given to attach-
ing strings to General Revenue Sharing Funds as well. Because at present
such strings would be viewed as contrary to the "new federalism," it appears
highly unlikely that Congress would be willing to restrict the distribution of
such funds to communities which are not engaging in exclusionary practices.
Such strings are unnecessary if Congress enacts anti-exclusionary legislation.
If Congress fails to enact such legislation, the elimination of exclusionary
practices in many states appears remote.
If a state decides to address the exclusionary problems within its bound-
aries either because it decides to bear its responsibility or because Congress.
enacts anti-exclusionary legislation which is applicable in the absence of effec-
tive state legislation, the legislation should contain certain basic provisions.
First, it should require the preparation of a statewide fair share housing allo-
cation plan which accurately reflects housing needs of the- state in relation to
the region in which the state is located. This plan is necessary so that the state
may determine areas in which only limited growth may he desirable. For
example, several areas may be identified as areas of environmental or ecologi-
cal importance and other areas may he identified as containing prime agricul-
tural land that should be preserved. Only statewide planning can effectively
A safer course of action would be for Congress to rely on U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5 to support such legislation. The Supreme Court has construed this clause as
giving Congress far more leeway in interfering with local governmental activities. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitter, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
272 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
273 For a discussion of this legislation, see notes 53.62 and accompanying text
supra.
274 There is little, if any, doubt that Congress can constitutionally impose con-
, ditions when exercising its spending powers. See Gelfand, supra note 269 and text ac-
companying notes 79-89.
2 " See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
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integrate the fair share housing plan with other state land use planning goals.
Second, a state agency, whether it be the state land use planning agency or a
special commission like the LCDC in Oregon, should have the authority to
review local plans and ordinances to determine if they are unduly exclusion-
ary.
Review should be available at the request of the local government, upon
petition by any person who is aggrieved, or upon the agency's motion. After
initial review, any changes or modifications would be subject to the agency's
review. Filially, the state agency should have the ability to enforce its determi-
nation that • a local government's plans or ordinances are unduly exclusionary.
The ability could he in the form of authority to seek judicial enforcement of
its orders as the present Oregon legislation does, 276
 or it could be in the form
of authorizing the state agency to amend the local ordinances to eliminate the
exclusionary practices when the local government has refused to comply with
the state agency's determination. Although the latter form may be more'effi-
cient, the former may be viewed as affording an approach that is less violative
of local autonomy.
If the Supreme Court, Congress, and the state legislatures fail to respond
to the exclusionary problem, the state courts are the last hope. As a result of
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Mount Laurel, 277 state courts
have a model that can be followed. If a state court has the opportunity to
adopt the Mount Laurel approach prior to any legislative action in the state, it
should do so thereby taking some of the political pressure off of state legis-
lators who can then adopt anti-exclusionary legislation on the grounds that
they are merely doing what the state constitution compels them to do.
If the people in this country are to be afforded the widest possible choice
in regard to where they may live, most or all of the recommended actions
must be implemented. To minimize the ever increasing housing and employ-
ment opportunity crisis facing millions of people in this country these actions
must be implemented in the immediate future. Failure to undertake the rec-
ommended actions cannot help but exacerbate a problem that is already at a
crisis level. The consequences of such a failure cannot help but be dire. To
permit some philosophical view of federalism to produce such dire conse-
quences is madness.
27 " See notes 257 and accompanying text supra.
277 For discussion of the Mount Laurel decision, see notes 196-201 and accom-
panying text supra.
